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Abstract
Metal-loss corrosion and third-party damage (TPD) are the leading threats to the integrity of
buried oil and natural gas pipelines. The pipeline industry is devoting significant efforts to
manage the integrity of pipelines with respect to these threats. The reliability-based integrity
management program is being increasingly adopted by pipeline operators to deal with
uncertainties associated with the corrosion and occurrence of TPD events. This thesis employs
Bayesian networks (BNs) and non-parametric Bayesian networks (NPBNs) to deal with four
issues with regard to the reliability-based management program of corrosion and TPD.
The pipeline operators periodically perform in-line inspections (ILIs) to detect and size the
corrosion defects on the pipelines. The first study integrates the quantification of measurement
errors of the ILI tools, corrosion growth modeling and reliability analysis in a single dynamic
Bayesian network (DBN) model, and employs the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm
in the context of the parameter learning to learn the parameters of the DBN model from the
ILI-reported and filed-measured corrosion depths. In comparison with existing growth models,
the integrating and graphical features of the developed model make the process of corrosion
management more intuitive and transparent to users. The employment of parameter learning
provides an objective and convenient approach to elicit the probabilistic information from ILI
and field measurement data.
The second study develops the BN model to estimate the probability of a given pipeline being
hit by third-party excavations by taking into account common preventative and protective
measures. The EM algorithm in the context of parameter learning is employed to learn the
parameters of the BN model from datasets that consist of individual cases of third-party
activities but with missing information. The developed BN model is advantageous over the
existing fault tree models in that it can handle the estimation of the probability of hit under
different scenarios of available information.

Moreover, the BN model and EM-based

parameter learning proposed in this study allow pipeline operators to estimate the probability
of hit by efficiently taking into account historical third-party excavation records in an objective
manner.
ii

The ILIs are infeasible for a portion of buried pipelines due to the reasons such as small pipe
diameters, tight bends, or a lack of launching and receiving stations for ILI tools, which are
known as unpiggable pipelines. To assist with the corrosion assessment for the unpiggable
pipelines, the third study develops a non-parametric Bayesian network (NPBN) model to
predict the corrosion depth on buried pipelines using the pipeline age and local soil properties
as the predictors. The dependence structure and parameters of the NPBN model are extracted
from Velázquez’s dataset, which consists of 250 samples of corrosion depths, pipeline age, and
such local soil properties as the water content, redox potential, and pH value.
The epistemic uncertainties in the basic random variables of reliability analysis of corroded
pipelines introduce uncertainty into the calculated failure probability Pf, which may affect the
decision making. The last study develops a sample size determination (SSD) method for
collecting samples to reduce the epistemic uncertainties in the probabilistic distributions of
basic random variables. This work first discretizes the continuous random variables and assign
Dirichlet prior distributions to the probability mass functions (PMFs) to characterize the
epistemic uncertainties. The total probability theorem is employed to express Pf in terms of
PMFs of the discretized variables and conditional failure probabilities corresponding to given
values of discretized variables. Then, the prior, posterior and pre-posterior analyses of Pf are
carried out. The optimal sample size criterion to maximize the expected net gain of sampling
(ENGS) is developed based on the result of the pre-posterior analysis of Pf and quadratic loss
function. The developed method is applied to determining the sample size of the model error
of a burst capacity model and determining the number of pipe joints to excavate for the
corrosion assessment of unpiggable pipelines.

Keywords
underground pipeline, corrosion, third-party damage, Bayesian network, non-parametric
Bayesian network, optimal sample size determination, value of information
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Summary for Lay Audience
The buried pipelines are the most widely used mode to transport oil and natural gas. The metalloss corrosion and damage from excavation activities can lead to pipeline incidents. To
manage the pipeline safety, pipeline companies need to estimate the probabilities of occurrence
of such incidents. This thesis uses graphical models known as Bayesian networks to enhance
the current practice of corrosion and excavation damage management. A Bayesian network
(BN) consists of circles to represent events and arrows to represent the relationship between
the events. Once a part of the model is observed, the probabilities of the rest of the events can
be calculated.
Pipeline companies routinely run inspection tools through the pipelines to detect and size
corrosion defects. The thesis develops a BN model to forecast the growth of the corrosion
depth and probability of failure at the specific corrosion defect using the corrosion depths
reported by the inspection tools. However, the inspection tools are infeasible for a portion of
pipelines due to the reasons such as small diameters and tight bends. To assist with the
corrosion assessment of such pipelines, the thesis develops a BN model to predict the corrosion
depth using the pipeline age and soil parameters.
To prevent the pipeline from excavation damage, the pipeline industry and regulatory agencies
employ a series of measures such as patrols along the pipeline, warning signs on the pipelines
and burial depth. The failures of all the preventative and protective measures can lead to the
pipeline being hit by the excavation machine. The present thesis develops a BN model to
estimate the probability of a given pipeline being hit by an excavation event. The probabilities
of the preventative and protective measures are automatedly learned from the historical data
collected by the pipeline industry.
To reduce the uncertainties in the corrosion management program, the pipeline industry often
collects samples by performing experiments or field measurements, which are generally
expensive. The fourth study in the thesis develops a method to determine the optimal sample
size from the economic standpoint and apply it to two sample size determination problems in
the context of corrosion management of pipelines.
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1

Introduction

1.1 Background
1.1.1

Pipeline integrity management and issues to address

Pipeline systems have been widely recognized as the most efficient and safest mode to
transport hydrocarbons (i.e. crude oil and natural gas) over long distances (Green and
Jackson, 2015). The structural integrity of pipelines is subject to various threats that
include external corrosion, internal corrosion, third-party damage (TPD), cracking,
material failures, among others (Cosham et al., 2007). The data collected by the Pipeline
and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the US Department of
Transportation report 464 pipe-related incidents on onshore gas transmission pipelines
between 2002 and 2013, of which the distribution by failure causes is depicted in Fig. 1.1
(Lam and Zhou, 2016). This figure indicates that external corrosion and third-party
damage are the first two leading threats, which therefore are the focuses of this thesis.
Since pipe-related incidents are generally associated with severe consequences in terms of
human safety, property damage and environmental impact, the pipeline industry and
regulatory agencies are devoting significant efforts to improve the safety of pipelines. The
reliability-based pipeline integrity management program is increasingly adopted by the
pipeline operators to deal with the uncertainties involved in the corrosion and occurrence
of TPD activities (Adianto et al., 2018; Kariyawasam and Peterson, 2008; Tomic et al.,
2018; Zhou, 2010).
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Others
24.80%

Material failure
16.80%

External corrosion
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Internal corrosion
8.40%
Third-party damage
26.30%

Figure 1.1 Distribution of pipe-related incidents between 2002 and 2013 by failure
causes based on PHMSA data
While external coating and cathodic protection (CP) are widely employed to protect the
pipeline from corrosion, corrosion may take place as a result of the breakdown of the
protection systems. Inline inspection (ILI) tools are routinely used to detect and size
corrosion defects. A typical magnetic flux leakage (MFL) based ILI tool, also known as
“smart pig”, is shown in Fig. 1.2. As the ILI tool travels through the pipeline, a magnetic
flux field is imposed on the pipeline wall. The metal-loss corrosion can cause the distortion
of the magnetic flux field as shown by Fig. 1.3, which can then be correlated with the size
of a defect. The profile of a typical corrosion defect on the external surface of the pipeline
characterized by maximum depth, length and width is given by Fig. 1.4. Note that the ILI
tools can differentiate between the corrosion defects on the external and internal surfaces
of pipelines.

Figure 1.2 A typical high-resolution MFL tool

3

Figure 1.3 ILI detection of magnetic flux leakage from an external corrosion defect

Maximum
depth

Wall
thickness

Longitudinal direction

Figure 1.4 Dimensions of a typical corrosion defect on the external surface of
pipeline
The reliability-based corrosion management program generally includes the periodical ILIs
to detect and size corrosion defects on a given pipeline, engineering critical assessment of
reported defects and mitigation of critical defects (Zhang, 2014). The accurate modeling
of corrosion growth is of great importance to the time-dependent reliability evaluation and
scheduling mitigation activities. Extensive studies have been reported in the literature to
model the corrosion growth probabilistically to account for the inherent random nature of
the corrosion growth (Ahammed, 1998; Caleyo et al., 2009a; Hong, 1999; Zhang, 2014;
Zhou et al., 2017). The growth models developed in the hierarchical Bayesian framework
are advantageous in that the ILI data can be incorporated to update the model parameters
(Maes et al., 2010; Pandey et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2014). The errors
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on the ILI data (i.e. biases and random scattering errors) are typically evaluated from
regression or Bayesian analyses and then incorporated in the growth model as an input (AlAmin et al., 2012). The growth models updated by ILI data can then be incorporated in
the reliability-based defect assessment, e.g. evaluation of the time-dependent probabilities
of failure of individual corrosion defects and/or system failure probability of a given pipe
segment containing multiple active defects (Al-Amin and Zhou, 2014; Pandey et al., 2009
). The three components, i.e. quantification of errors on ILI data, growth modeling of
corrosion defects and time-dependent reliability analysis provide a reasonable framework
to account for various uncertainties in the reliability-based corrosion management
program. However, the implementation of these components in practice has the following
difficulties: 1) the complexity of the hierarchical Bayesian models and Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC ) technique renders them difficult to use by non-specialists; 2) The
quantification of errors on ILI data, Bayesian growth model updating and failure
probability evaluation should be carried out in separated steps or models. It is therefore
desirable from a practical perspective to combine the three components into a single
integrated analysis and develop a tool more amenable to the corrosion management
practice in the pipeline industry.
In practice, there are pipelines for which ILIs are infeasible or extremely difficult to
conduct due to various reasons such as the tight bends, over- or under-size valves,
complicated connections and a lack of launching and receiving stations for ILI tools (Rau
and Kirkwood, 2016; Beauregard et al., 2018). Such pipelines are commonly known as
unpiggable pipelines. The lack of inspection data presents significant challenge to the
corrosion assessment of unpiggable pipelines. Since the corrosion deterioration on buried
pipelines is greatly influenced by the corrosive properties of surrounding soils,
characterizing the correlation of corrosion sizes with local soil parameters has received a
great deal of attention in the research community (Velázquez et al., 2009; Caleyo et al,
2009b; Ricker, 2010; Melchers and Petersen, 2018). Velázquez et al. (2010) reported a
corrosion dataset with 259 samples, of which each individual sample consists of the
corrosion depth, pipeline age, and local soil parameters. Such dataset can be used to
develop a model for predicting the corrosion depth using soil parameters as predictors. The
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developed predictive model will be of great practical value for the corrosion assessment of
unpiggable pipelines (Beauregard et al., 2018).
A third party is neither a pipeline operator nor a contractor hired by the operator to service
the pipeline; in other words, a third party is an individual or organization unrelated to
pipeline assets.

Commonly used preventative and protective measures include, for

example, the one-call system (third parties notify the pipeline operators through one-call
centers before excavation), warning signs along the pipeline right-of-way (ROW), regular
patrol of ROW, burial depth of pipelines and physical protection such as concrete slabs
buried above the pipeline alignment. In the reliability-based pipeline integrity management
program with respect to TPD, the fault tree model is widely employed to estimate the
probability of hit (Chen and Nessim, 1999). In the fault tree model, the failures of the
preventative and protective measures are known as basic events, and a pipeline being hit
by a third-party activity is modeled as the result of occurrences of these basic events. In
the practice of TPD management over the past few decades, pipeline operators have
collected a substantial amount of TPD related data such as the individual TPD activities
including the information of pipeline attributes, prevention measures and consequences of
the TPD activities, and it is highly desirable to use the collected data to estimate the
probabilities of basic events.
In the reliability analysis of corroded pipelines, the epistemic uncertainties in the
probabilistic distributions of basic random variables introduce uncertainty into the
calculated failure probability, which may affect the decision-making (Der Kiureghian,
1989). The epistemic uncertainties can be reduced by collecting samples of the basic
random variables and using these samples to update the corresponding probability
distributions. Since the sampling cost is in general high, the sample size should be
determined by balancing between the cost and associated benefit. This is commonly
known as the sample size determination (SSD). The existing methods can only address
SSD problem for specific distributions (Nishijima and Faber, 2007; Higo and Pandey,
2016). It is therefore desirable to develop a general framework that can deal with SSD for
a wide range of probability distributions by considering the impact of epistemic
uncertainties in the distributions of basic random variables on the failure probability.
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1.1.2

Research tools – Bayesian networks and non-parametric Bayesian
networks

A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical acyclic diagram (DAG) representing the joint
distribution of a set of random variables. A BN consists of nodes symbolizing the random
variables and arcs symbolizing causal relationships between the nodes.

Given the

observation on a subset of the nodes in a BN, the joint probability distribution of the rest
of the nodes in the BN can be updated through Bayes’ theorem. This is the so-called
inference, the most important application of BNs.

Various exact and approximate

inference algorithms are described in many textbooks (e.g. Nielsen and Jensen, 2009; Pearl,
2014). BNs are generally applicable to discrete random variables (Langseth et al., 2009).
The marginal and conditional distributions of discrete random variables are defined
through the probability mass functions and conditional probability tables (CPT),
respectively. The entries in the CPTs are called the parameters of the BN, which can either
be specified by experts or extracted from data through the parameter learning (Heckerman,
1998). Due to the intuitive graphical nature and ability to efficiently handle the Bayesian
updating of a large set of random variables, BNs have become increasingly popular in the
engineering reliability and risk analysis during the last two decades, including using
dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) to model the deterioration of structures (Luque and
Straub, 2016; Straub, 2009), and utilizing BNs to evaluate and update the reliability of
structures (Mahadevan et al., 2001; Straub and Der Kiureghian, 2010a; Straub and Der
Kiureghian, 2010b).
Continuous random variables are generally discretized to be included in a BN. If a
significant number of continuous random variables are however included in a BN, each of
them discretized by a sufficiently large number of states to ensure the computational
accuracy, the efforts for specifying the CPTs can become prohibitively burdensome.
Moreover, carrying out inference in BNs with significantly large CPTs can be
computationally prohibitive. The Non-parametric Bayesian network (NPBN) is developed
to overcome the above-described drawbacks of the BN in dealing with continuous random
variables (Kurowicka and Cooke, 2005). An NPBN is a DAG with nodes and arcs
symbolizing a set of continuous random variables and dependence between them,
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respectively. The dependence between any two nodes is quantified by the (conditional)
Spearman’s rank correlation, which is the correlation coefficient between ranks, i.e.
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), of the two variables. An NPBN characterizes
the joint distribution of the continuous random variables involved by a copula. While any
copula function can be used in NPBN, the Gaussian copula is of particular importance to
NPBN mainly because it allows analytical inferences. The employment of Gaussian copula
NPBNs has become increasingly popular for the high dimensional dependence modeling
and risk analysis (Zilko et al., 2016; Morales-Napoles and Steenbergen 2014; Hanea et al.,
2015; Morale-Napoles et al., 2014; Hanea et al., 2013; Lee and Pan, 2018; Wang et al.,
2019).
A number of software tools are available to deal with BN modeling and inference (Mahjoub
and Kalti, 2011), among which the commercial software tools Netica® and UNINET® are
employed to deal with discrete Bayesian networks and non-parametric Bayesian networks,
respectively.

The modeling and parameter learning for BN models consisting of

discrete/discretized random variables are implemented in the user-interface of Netica®.
The NPBN model mining and updating based on a multivariate dataset are implemented in
the software UNINET®.

1.2 Objective and research significance
The objectives of this thesis include: 1) integrate the quantification of measurement errors
of ILI tools, corrosion growth modeling and reliability analysis in a single DBN model for
the reliability-based corrosion management of oil and gas pipelines, and employ the
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm to learn the model parameters from ILIreported and field-measured corrosion depths; 2) develop a BN model for evaluating the
probability of hit given a third-party activity and employ the EM algorithm to learn the
model parameters from historical data of third-party activities collected by the pipeline
operators; 3) develop an NPBN model for predicting the corrosion depth using the pipeline
age and soil parameters as predictors; 4) develop a methodology for determining the
optimal sample size by balancing the sampling cost and associated benefit, which is then
used to solve two SSD problems in the context of corrosion management of pipelines. It
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is expected that the developed models and methodology in this thesis can benefit the
integrity management of energy pipelines with respect to corrosion and third-party damage.

1.3 Scope of the study
Chapters 2 through 5 present four main topics, respectively. Chapter 2 integrates the
quantification of measurement errors of in-line inspection (ILI) tools, corrosion growth
modeling and reliability analysis in a single dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) model for
the reliability-based corrosion management of oil and gas pipelines. The EM algorithm in
the context of the parameter learning technique is employed to learn the parameters of the
DBN model. The effectiveness of the parameter learning and the predictive accuracy of
the DBN model are validated by the simulated and real corrosion data, respectively.
Chapter 3 develops a BN model to estimate the probability of a given pipeline being hit by
third-party excavations by taking into account common protective and preventative
measures. The EM algorithm is employed to learn the parameters of the BN model from
datasets that consist of individual cases of third-party activities but with missing
information. The effectiveness of the parameter learning for the developed Bayesian
network is demonstrated by a numerical example involving simulated datasets of thirdparty activities and a case study using real-world datasets obtained from a major pipeline
operator in Canada. Chapter 4 develops an NPBN model to predict the corrosion depth on
buried pipelines using the pipeline age and local soil parameters as predictors. The
dependence structure and parameters of the NPBN model are extracted from a corrosion
dataset in the open literature, which consists of individual samples of the corrosion depth,
pipeline age together with a group of parameters characterizing the corrosive properties of
local soil such as water content, redox potential, pH value. The 5-fold cross-validation is
used to examine the predictive capability of the developed model. Chapter 5 establishes a
methodology of SSD for collecting samples to update the distributions of basic random
variables, thus reduce the epistemic uncertainty on the evaluated failure probability. The
methodology is developed based on the pre-posterior analysis of the probability mass
functions (PMFs) of basic random variables in the reliability analysis and the theory of
value of information (VoI). The developed methodology is then applied to solve two SSD
problems in the context of corrosion assessment of buried pipelines: determining the
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sample size of the model error of a burst capacity model and determining the number of
pipe joints to excavate for the corrosion assessment of unpiggable pipelines.
An overview of the remainder of the thesis is given in Fig. 1.5, based on which the link
between the four research projects in Chapters 2 through 5 is described as follows. In the
aspect of techniques, Chapters 2 and 3 both employ the BNs to model the dependence
structure of a set of discrete/discretized random variables, and parameter learning
technique to extract model parameters from the datasets collected by the pipeline industry.
Chapter 4 employs NPBN and the model mining technique to construct both the
dependence structure between a set of continuous random variables and model parameters
(i.e. rank correlations) from a multivariate dataset. The SSD methodology presented in
Chapter 5 is established on the basis of two key ideas: the discretization of continuous
random variables and Bayesian pre-posterior analysis by exploiting the DirichletMultinomial conjugate pair, which originate from the parameter learning theory of
Bayesian networks. In the aspect of engineering practice, Chapters 2 and 4 deal with
corrosion assessment of pipelines with ILI data and pipelines lacking ILI data (i.e.
unpiggable pipelines), respectively. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of TPD management.
Lastly, the SSD methodology developed in Chapter 5 can be applied for the sampling
planning for reducing the epistemic uncertainty involved in the reliability analysis of
corroded pipelines, which is illustrated by two numerical examples.
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Applications

Thesis contents

Corrosion assessment of
pipelines with ILI data

Chapter 2: Growth modeling
of corrosion depth

Techniques

Discrete BNs and
parameter learning

TPD management of
underground pipelines

Chapter 3: Modeling
probability of third-party
damage

Corrosion assessment of
pipelines lacking ILI
data

Chapter 4: Predictive model
of corrosion depth based on
soil parameters

NPBN and model
mining

Chapter 5: Optimal sample
size determination from
economic standpoint

Discretizing
continuous random
variables, pre-posterior
analysis exploiting
Dirichlet-Multinomial
conjugate pair

Sampling planning for
reducing epistemic
uncertainty in the
reliability analysis of
corroded pipelines

Figure 1.5 Overview of the research topics in the thesis

1.4 Thesis format
This thesis is prepared in an Integrated-Article Format as specified by the School of
Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies at Western University, London, Ontario, Canada. Six
chapters are included in the thesis. Chapter 1 presents the introduction of the thesis which
includes the research background, objective and research significance, scope of the study
and thesis format. Chapters 2 through 5 are the main body of the thesis, of which each
chapter solves an individual topic.

The main conclusions, limitations and

recommendations for future research regarding the topics in the thesis are provided in
Chapter 6.

References
Adianto, R., Nessim, M., Kariyawasam, S., and Huang, T. (2018). Implementation of
Reliability-Based Criteria for Corrosion Assessment. In Proceedings of the 12th
International Pipeline Conference. Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Ahammed, M. (1998). Probabilistic estimation of remaining life of a pipeline in the
presence of active corrosion defects. International Journal of Pressure Vessels and
Piping, 75, 321-329.
Al-Amin, M., & Zhou, W. (2014). Evaluating the system reliability of corroding pipelines
based on inspection data. Structure and Infrastructure Engineering, 10(9), 11611175.

11

Al-Amin, M., Zhou, W., Zhang, S., Kariyawasam, S., & Wang, H. (2012). Bayesian model
for calibration of ILI tools. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Pipeline
Conference (pp. 201-208), Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Beauregard, Y., Woo, A., and Huang, T. (2018). Application of In-Line Inspection and
Failure Data to Reduce Subjectivity of Risk Model Scores for Uninspected
Pipelines. In Proceedings of the 12th International Pipeline Conference (pp.
V002T07A028-V002T07A028). Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Caleyo, F., Velázquez, J. C., Valor, A., and Hallen, J. M. (2009a). Markov chain modelling
of pitting corrosion in underground pipelines. Corrosion Science, 51(9), 21972207.
Caleyo, F., Velázquez, J. C., Valor, A., and Hallen, J. M. (2009b). Probability distribution
of pitting corrosion depth and rate in underground pipelines: A Monte Carlo
study. Corrosion Science, 51(9), 1925-1934.
Chen, Q., Nessim, M. A. 1999. Reliability-based prevention of mechanical damage to
pipelines. submitted to Pipeline Research Council International, Inc., Catalogue,
(L51816).
Cosham, A., Hopkins, P., and Macdonald, K. A. (2007). Best practice for the assessment
of defects in pipelines–Corrosion. Engineering Failure Analysis, 14(7), 12451265.
Der Kiureghian, A. (1989). Measures of structural safety under imperfect states of
knowledge. Journal of Structural Engineering, 115(5), 1119-1140.
Green, K. P., and Jackson, T. (2015). Safety in the transportation of Oil and Gas: pipelines
or rail?. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute.
Hanea, A. M., Gheorghe, M., Hanea, R., and Ababei, D. (2013). Non-parametric Bayesian
networks for parameter estimation in reservoir simulation: a graphical take on the
ensemble Kalman filter (part I). Computational geosciences, 17(6), 929-949.
Hanea, A., Napoles, O. M., and Ababei, D. (2015). Non-parametric Bayesian networks:
Improving theory and reviewing applications. Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, 144, 265-284.
Heckerman, D. (1998). A tutorial on learning with Bayesian networks. In: Jordan M.
(Eds.), Learning in graphical models (pp. 301-354), Springer, Dordrecht.
Higo, E., and Pandey, M. D. (2016). Value of information and hypothesis testing
approaches for sample size determination in engineering component inspection: a
comparison. In: Proceedings of ASME 2016 Pressure Vessels and Piping
Conference (pp. V005T10A009-V005T10A009), Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada.
Hong, H-P. (1999) Application of the stochastic process to pitting corrosion. Corrosion,
55(1):10-16.
Kariyawasam, S. and Peterson, W. (2008). Revised corrosion management with reliability
based excavation criteria. In Proceedings of the 7th International Pipeline
Conference. Calgary, Alberta, Canada.

12

Kurowicka, D., and Cooke, R. M. (2005). Distribution-free continuous Bayesian
belief. Modern statistical and mathematical methods in reliability, 10, 309.
Langseth, H., Nielsen, T. D., Rumí, R., and Salmerón, A. (2009). Inference in hybrid
Bayesian networks. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 94(10), 1499-1509.
Lam, C., and Zhou, W. (2016). Statistical analyses of incidents on onshore gas transmission
pipelines based on PHMSA database. Internal Journal of Pressurized Vessels and
Piping, 145, 29-40.
Lee, D., and Pan, R. (2018). A nonparametric Bayesian network approach to assessing
system reliability at early design stages. Reliability Engineering and System
Safety, 171, 57-66.
Luque, J., Straub, D. (2016). Reliability analysis and updating of deteriorating systems
with dynamic Bayesian networks. Structural Safety, 62, 34-46.
Mahadevan, S., Zhang, R., and Smith, N. (2001). Bayesian networks for system reliability
reassessment. Structural Safety, 23(3), 231-251.
Mahjoub, M. A., and Kalti, K. (2011). Software comparison dealing with bayesian
networks. In International Symposium on Neural Networks (pp. 168-177).
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Maes, M. A., Faber, M. H., and Dann, M. R. (2010). Hierarchical modeling of pipeline
defect growth subject to ILI uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 28th International
Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering (pp. 375-384). Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA.
Melchers, R. E., and Petersen, R. B. (2018). A reinterpretation of the Romanoff NBS data
for corrosion of steels in soils. Corrosion Engineering, Science and
Technology, 53(2), 131-140.
Morales-Nápoles, O., Delgado-Hernández, D. J., De-León-Escobedo, D., and ArteagaArcos, J. C. (2014). A continuous Bayesian network for earth dams' risk
assessment: methodology and quantification. Structure and Infrastructure
Engineering, 10(5), 589-603.
Morales-Nápoles, O., and Steenbergen, R. D. (2014). Large-scale hybrid Bayesian network
for traffic load modeling from weigh-in-motion system data. Journal of Bridge
Engineering, 20(1), 04014059.
Nielsen, T., and Jensen, F. (2009). Bayesian networks and decision graphs. New York,
NY: Springer Science and Business Media.
Nishijima, K., and Faber M.H. (2007) Bayesian approach to proof loading of quasiidentical multi-components structural systems. Civil Engineering and
Environmental Systems, 24 (2), 111-121.
Pandey, M.D., Yuan, X.-X., and van Noortwijk, J.M. (2009). The influence of temporal
uncertainty of deterioration on life-cycle management of structures. Structure and
Infrastructure Engineering, 5(2), 145-156.

13

Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible
Beliefs. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, Calif.
Rau, J., and Kirkwood, M. (2016). Hydrotesting and In-Line Inspection: Now and in the
Future. In Proceedings of the 11th International Pipeline Conference (pp.
V001T03A055-V001T03A055), Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Ricker, R. E. (2010). Analysis of pipeline steel corrosion data from NBS (NIST) studies
conducted between 1922–1940 and relevance to pipeline management. Journal of
research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 115(5), 373.
Straub, D. (2009). Stochastic modeling of deterioration processes through dynamic
Bayesian networks. Journal of Engineering Mechanics, 135(10), 1089-1099.
Straub, D., Der Kiureghian, A. (2010a). Bayesian network enhanced with structural
reliability methods: methodology. Journal of engineering mechanics, 136(10),
1248-1258.
Straub, D., Der Kiureghian, A. (2010b). Bayesian network enhanced with structural
reliability methods: application. Journal of Engineering Mechanics, 136(10), 12591270.
Tomic, A., Huang, T., and Kariyawasam, S. (2018). System Wide Risk Assessment in the
21st Century: TransCanada’s Approach. In Proceedings of the 12th International
Pipeline Conference. Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Velázquez, J. C., Caleyo, F., Valor, A., and Hallen, J. M. (2009). Predictive model for
pitting corrosion in buried oil and gas pipelines. Corrosion, 65(5), 332-342.
Velázquez, J. C., Caleyo, F., Valor, A., and Hallen, J. M. (2010). Field Study—Pitting
Corrosion of Underground Pipelines Related to Local Soil and Pipe
Characteristics. Corrosion, 66(1), 016001-016001.
Wang, F., Li, H., Dong, C., and Ding, L. (2019). Knowledge representation using nonparametric Bayesian networks for tunneling risk analysis. Reliability Engineering
and System Safety, 106529.
Zhang, S. (2014). Development of probabilistic corrosion growth models with applications
in integrity management of pipelines. Western University. London, Ontario,
Canada.
Zhang, S., Zhou, W., Al-Amin, M., Kariyawasam, S., Wang, H. (2014). Time-Dependent
Corrosion Growth Modeling Using Multiple In-Line Inspection Data. Journal of
Pressure Vessel Technology, 136(4), 041202.
Zhang, S., Zhou, W., Qin, H. (2013). Inverse Gaussian process-based corrosion growth
model for energy pipelines considering the sizing error in inspection data.
Corrosion Science, 73, 309-320.
Zhou, W. (2010). System reliability of corroding pipelines. International Journal of
Pressure Vessels and Piping, 87(10): 587-595.

14

Zhou, W., Xiang, W., and Hong, H. P. (2017). Sensitivity of system reliability of corroding
pipelines to modeling of stochastic growth of corrosion defects. Reliability
Engineering & System Safety, 167, 428-438.
Zilko, A. A., Kurowicka, D., and Goverde, R. M. (2016). Modeling railway disruption
lengths with Copula Bayesian Networks. Transportation Research Part C:
Emerging Technologies, 68, 350-368.

15

2

Integrated pipeline corrosion growth modeling and reliability
analysis using the dynamic Bayesian network and parameter
learning technique

2.1 Introduction
Historical failure data indicate that metal-loss corrosion is one of the leading threats to the
structural integrity of underground oil and gas pipelines (CEPA, 2015). In the past few
decades, in-line inspections (ILIs) have been widely adopted by the pipeline industry to
detect and size the corrosion defects on pipelines (Kariyawasam and Peterson, 2010). The
pipeline corrosion management program typically includes periodical ILIs to detect and
size corrosion defects on pipeline segments, engineering critical assessment of the detected
corrosion defects, and appropriate mitigation actions or scheduling the future ILIs. The
accurate modeling of corrosion growth is of great importance to the corrosion management
program. Critical corrosion defects may be missed by scheduled mitigation activities if the
corrosion growth is significantly underestimated. On the other hand, overly conservative
estimates of the growth may lead to unnecessary mitigation actions, which translates into
significant cost penalties to pipeline operators.
It is advantageous to model the corrosion growth probabilistically to account for the
inherent random nature of the corrosion growth. To this end, extensive studies have been
reported in the literature, e.g. the linear and power-law growth models (Ahammed, 1998;
Al-Amin and Zhou, 2014; Amirat et al., 2010), and stochastic process-based growth
models (Hong, 1999; Pandey et al., 2009; Valor et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2017). The
hierarchical Bayesian models and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation
technique have been employed to effectively estimate the parameters of corrosion growth
models based on the ILI data (Pandey et al., 2009). However, the complexity of the
hierarchical Bayesian model and MCMC technique renders them difficult to use by nonspecialists in practice.
The defect depth reported by an ILI tool is typically assumed to be a linear function of the
actual depth subjected to a random scattering error. The slope and intercept of the linear
function are called the multiplicative and additive biases associated with the ILI tool,
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respectively. The probabilistic characteristics of the multiplicative and additive biases, as
well as the standard deviation of the scattering error are typically evaluated from regression
or Bayesian analyses (Al-Amin et al., 2012; Nessim et al., 2008) and then incorporated in
the growth model as an input (Al-Amin and Zhou, 2014). The updated growth model also
becomes an input in the reliability-based defect assessment, e.g. evaluation of the timedependent probabilities of failure of individual active corrosion defects and/or system
failure probability of a given pipe segment containing multiple active defects (Al-Amin
and Zhou, 2014). It hinders the wide application of the Bayesian growth model in practice
that three separate models are employed for the ILI measurement error characterization,
growth model updating, and reliability analysis. It is therefore desirable from a practical
perspective to combine the three components into a single integrated analysis. This is the
main motivation of the present study.
Due to the intuitive graphical nature and ability to efficiently handle the Bayesian updating
of a set of random variables, Bayesian networks (BNs) have become increasingly popular
in the engineering reliability and risk analysis during the last two decades. The applications
closely relevant to the present study include using dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) to
model the deterioration of structures (Luque and Straub, 2016; Straub, 2009), and utilizing
BNs to evaluate and update the reliability of structures (Mahadevan et al., 2001; Straub
and Der Kiureghian, 2010). As an important feature of BNs, the parameter learning
technique (Heckerman, 1998; Spiegelhalter et al., 1993) provides an objective, efficient
means to elicit model parameters in BNs from sparse data. While studies of parameter
learning algorithms have been extensively reported in the field of Bayesian artificial
intelligence (Heckerman, 1998; Masegosa et al., 2016; Spiegelhalter et al., 1993; Zhou et
al., 2016), the application of this technique in civil engineering is scarce so far.
In the present study, an integrated DBN model is developed to characterize the growth of
depths of corrosion defects based on the ILI data and evaluate the time-dependent failure
probabilities of active corrosion defects. The novelty of the study is two-fold. First, three
critical components in the pipeline corrosion management, i.e. ILI measurement error
characterization, growth model updating, and reliability analysis are integrated into a single
DBN model. Second, the parameter learning technique is employed to evaluate the
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probabilistic characteristics of the measurement errors associated with the ILI tools and
parameters of the defect growth model, based on the ILI-reported and field-measured
depths of corrosion defects. This allows the parameters of the DBN model to be quantified
in an automated and objective manner. The proposed model is illustrated and validated
through a numerical example involving simulated corrosion data, and applied to real ILI
and field-measured corrosion data obtained from an in-service natural gas pipeline in
Canada. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The basics of BNs and
parameter learning technique are briefly presented in Section 2.2. The proposed DBN
model is described in Section 2.3. The application of the proposed model on simulated and
real corrosion data is described in Section 2.4, followed by conclusions in Section 2.5.

2.2 Basics of Bayesian networks and parameter learning
A brief introduction of BNs and the parameter learning technique is presented in the
following. More detailed discussions of BNs can be found in many textbooks (e.g. Nielsen
and Jensen, 2009; Pearl, 2014). BNs are directed graphical models representing the joint
probabilistic distribution of a set of random variables, which are symbolized by nodes in
BNs. While BN modeling can handle both discrete and, in some special cases, continuous
random variables (Langseth et al., 2009), BN models discussed in this work are limited to
discrete random variables. Therefore, random variables that are inherently continuous will
be discretized in the BN models. The discrete values of a given random variable are called
states. The dependence between nodes is symbolized by directed arcs and quantified by
conditional probability tables (CPTs) attached to them. The CPTs enable BNs to factor the
high-dimensional joint probability distribution into local conditional probability
distributions. The assignment of observed values to the corresponding nodes is called the
instantiation of the nodes, which can lead to the Bayesian updating of the nodes that are
dependent on the instantiated nodes. As an example, consider the BN model shown in Fig.
2.1. The nodes A and B with arcs pointing to node C are the parents of C, denoted by pa(C),
and C is the child node of A and B. The nodes A and B are called the root nodes, as they
do not have parent nodes. Note that the CPTs of root nodes coincide with their probability
mass functions (PMFs). The joint PMF of all the random variables involved in this model
is expressed as follows by the chain rule,
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𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑) = 𝑝(𝑎)𝑝(𝑏)𝑝(𝑐|𝑎, 𝑏)𝑝(𝑑|𝑐)

(2.1)

where a, b, c, d denote the states of A, B, C, D, respectively; p(●) denotes the PMF of node
●, and p(●|) denotes the conditional PMF for node ●. If the state of C is observed to be ce,
the posterior joint PMF of the rest of the nodes can be calculated based on Bayes’ rule as
follows,
𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑|𝑐e ) =

𝑝(𝑎)𝑝(𝑏)𝑝(𝑐e |𝑎,𝑏)𝑝(𝑑|𝑐e )
∑𝐴,𝐵 𝑝(𝑎)𝑝(𝑏)𝑝(𝑐e |𝑎,𝑏)

(2.2)

Then, the posterior marginal distribution of each node can be calculated by summing out
the rest of the nodes from the posterior joint PMF given in Eq. (2.2). The Bayesian
updating can be made more efficient by transferring the BN model into a junction tree and
carrying out the Bayesian inference with cliques as opposed to individual nodes. The
junction tree algorithm (Nielsen and Jensen, 2009) has been the standard algorithm
implemented in most BN software.

A

B

C

D

Figure 2.1 An example BN model
As a special case of BNs, DBNs have been used to model the stochastic deterioration of
engineering structures (Luque and Straub, 2016; Rafiq et al., 2010; Straub, 2009). A DBN
consists of a sequence of slices, each of which contains one or multiple nodes
characterizing the system state at a specific temporal point. The dependence between
different slices is symbolized by arcs that link nodes in different slices. If the dependence
between nodes within a slice and between slices is identical for all the slices except for the
first one, the DBN is referred to as a homogeneous DBN (Murphy, 2002; Straub, 2009).
An example of expanded DBN is given in Fig. 2.2, while it can also be defined in a compact
form with only the first two slices. When the nodes in a certain time-slice are instantiated,
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the querying of previous, current and future time-slices in a DBN is termed as smoothing,
filtering and prediction, respectively. The naïve inference algorithm on expanded DBNs
is the same as the junction tree algorithm for BNs, i.e. treating the expanded DBN as a BN
containing the nodes in all the time-slices. This is computationally inefficient for DBNs
with a large number of time-slices. The special algorithms such as the Frontier Algorithm
(Zweig, 1996) and Interface Algorithm (Murphy, 2002) were developed to adapt the
junction tree algorithm to perform the inference for DBNs in more efficient manners.
X0

Xi-1

Xi

Xi+1

XT

Y0

Yi-1

Yi

Yi+1

YT

Figure 2.2 An example DBN model
The entries in the CPTs are called parameters of BNs, which are usually specified based
on a combination of mathematical models, expert opinions, and collected data. The
parameter learning is an effective approach to obtain Bayesian estimates of parameters of
BNs from a set of observations on the nodes. A brief description of the parameter learning
is provided below using parameters of node C in the BN model depicted in Fig. 2.1 as an
example. Readers are referred to Heckerman (1998) for details. Let p(cj|pa(C)k) (j = 1, 2,
..., rc, k = 1, 2, …, rpa) denote the parameters of C, i.e. the probability of the j-th state (cj)
under the k-th parent configuration (pa(C)k), where rc and rpa are the total numbers of states
and parent configurations of C, respectively. For notational simplicity, p(cj|pa(C)k) is
𝑟

𝑐
replaced by the shorthand notation θj,k hereafter. It follows that ∑𝑗=1
𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 1 for k = 1, 2,

…, rpa. For a given parent configuration k, θj,k (j = 1, 2, ..., rc) are considered as a vector
of random variables following a Dirichlet distribution with parameters α1,k, α2,k, …, 𝛼𝑟𝑐,𝑘
(Heckerman, 1998). Before observations are obtained, the estimated value of θj,k, denoted
by 𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 , can be set to the corresponding mean of the Dirichlet distribution,
𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 =

𝛼𝑗,𝑘
𝛼0,𝑘

(2.3)
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𝑟

𝑐
where 𝛼0,𝑘 = ∑𝑗=1
𝛼𝑗,𝑘 is known as the equivalent sample size of the Dirichlet distribution

(Heckerman, 1998).
Once a set of observations are obtained, the Bayesian updating of the distribution of θj,k (j
= 1, 2, ..., rc) is carried out. Consider first the simple scenario of complete (no missing)
data, i.e. each of the observations containing values of A, B, C and D. The observations
are considered drawn from a multinomial distribution (Heckerman, 1998). Given the
Dirichlet-multinomial conjugate pair, the posterior distribution of θj,k is also a Dirichlet
distribution with parameters α1,k + n1,k, α2,k + n2,k, …, 𝛼𝑟𝑐,𝑘 + 𝑛𝑟𝑐,𝑘 , where nj,k (j = 1, 2, …
rc) is the number of observations of C in the j-th state under the k-th parent configuration.
With the observations, 𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 can be set to the mean of the posterior Dirichlet distribution,
i.e.
𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 =

𝛼𝑗,𝑘 +𝑛𝑗,𝑘

(2.4)

𝛼0,𝑘 +𝑛0,𝑘
𝑟

𝑐
where 𝑛0,𝑘 = ∑𝑗=1
𝑛𝑗,𝑘 . This completes the parameter learning for C under the complete

data scenario.
Now consider the scenario of incomplete or missing data, which is often encountered in
practice. Assume that there are a total of n sets of observations (i.e. n cases), each of which
contains values of A, B and D, but misses the value of C. The Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977) is commonly employed to learn the parameters of
C. To this end, the posterior distribution of θj,k is a Dirichlet distribution with parameters
α1,k + E[n1,k], α2,k + E[n2,k], …, 𝛼𝑟𝑐,𝑘 + E[𝑛𝑟𝑐,𝑘 ], where E[nj,k] (j = 1, 2, … rc) is the expected
number of observations of C in the j-th state under the k-th parent configuration. The value
of E[nj,k] is estimated as follows,
E[𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ] = ∑𝑛𝑙=1 𝑝(𝑐𝑗 , pa(𝐶)𝑘 |𝑂𝑙 )

(2.5)

where 𝑝(𝑐𝑗 , pa(𝐶)𝑘 |𝑂𝑙 ) is the probability of cj under pa(C)k given the l-th (l = 1, 2, …, n)
case Ol, and can be obtained from the BN inference once the BN is instantiated by the
evidence in Ol, i.e. corresponding values of A, B and D. The value of 𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 is now given by
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𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 =

𝛼𝑗,𝑘 +E[𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ]
𝑟

𝑐 E[𝑛 ]
𝛼0,𝑘 +∑𝑗=1
𝑗,𝑘

(2.6)

It follows that the evaluation of Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6) is an iterative process, as 𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 obtained
in the current iteration is used to estimate E[nj,k] and thus leads to a new 𝜃̂𝑗,𝑘 in the next
iteration. The iteration is terminated once the log-likelihood of the observations converges
to a local maximum, and this completes the parameter learning for C under the missing
data scenario.

2.3 Corrosion growth modeling by a dynamic Bayesian network
This section presents the development of the DBN-based growth model for the defect depth
(i.e. in the through-pipe wall thickness direction) and procedures to learn the parameters of
root nodes from ILI-reported and field-measured defect depths. The growth of the depth
of an individual defect is assumed to follow a linear function of time with an uncertain
annual growth rate, and is modeled by a DBN at discrete time points. The ILI-reported
defect depths can be used to instantiate the corresponding nodes in the DBN for model
updating. The description is based on a DBN model for a given corrosion defect as
depicted in Fig. 2.3, which includes four time-slices. Time-slice 0 represents year 0, i.e.
the time of the first ILI considered in the modeling, and each subsequent time-slice
represents an increment of one year. Nodes X0, X1, X2 and X3 represent the defect depths
at years 0, 1, 2 and 3, respectively. It follows that X1 - X0 = X2 - X1 = X3 - X2 = ΔX, where
ΔX is the depth increment within a year. It is assumed that ILI is carried out at years 0 and
2. Nodes Y0 and Y2 represent the ILI-reported defect depths at years 0 and 2, respectively.
The relationship between Yi and Xi (i = 0, 2) is defined by (Al-Amin et al., 2012),
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (i = 0, 2)

(2.7)

where βi, γi and εi denote the multiplicative bias, additive bias and random scattering error,
respectively, associated with the ILI tool employed at year i. Typically, βi and γi are
considered as deterministic quantities, and εi is assumed to follow a zero-mean Gaussian
distribution with the standard deviation denoted by σi (Al-Amin et al., 2012). To reduce
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the number of parameters involved in the parameter learning and thus increase its
effectiveness, Eq. (2.7) is re-written as follows,
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖′ (i = 0, 2)

(2.8)

where 𝛾𝑖′ follows the Gaussian distribution with the mean value and standard deviation
equal to γi and σi, respectively. Based on Eq. (2.8), a single node 𝛾𝑖′ is used in the DBN
model to account for the additive bias γi and random scattering error εi of the ILI tool.
TIme-slice 1

ΔX

Time-slice 0

ΔX

ΔX

S2

X1

X2

S3

X3

Y2

Y0

β0

TIme-slice 3

S1

S0
X0

TIme-slice 2

γ0

β2

γ2

Figure 2.3 Conceptual DBN growth model of defect depth
Since all the random variables contained in the above-described DBN model are
continuous in nature, they are first discretized. While the dynamic discretization technique
(Marquez et al., 2010) can be employed to make the discretization adaptive to achieve the
most accurate characterization of the high density regions of the distribution, the present
study adopts a simple discretization scheme: each node is partitioned by a set of equal
intervals, with the interval size pre-selected. The CPTs of Xj (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) and Yi (i = 0,
2) are created using the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation (Straub, 2009; Straub and Der
Kiureghian, 2010). For instance, the entries of the CPT of Y2 conditioned on a given parent
configuration are created as follows. The values of X2, β2 and 𝛾2′ are assumed to be
uniformly distributed between the lower and upper bounds of given states, from which the
samples can be generated. The samples of Y2 can then be calculated using Eq. (2.8). The
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counts of samples of Y2 lying in a certain state of Y2 normalized by the total number of
samples is the parameter associated with that state.
Although ΔX appears in time-slices 1, 2 and 3, it is emphasized that ΔX in time-slices 2
and 3 is a copy of ΔX in time-slice 1, thus consistent with the linear growth (i.e. constant
growth rate) model adopted in this study. Symmetric Dirichlet distributions with the
equivalent sample size equal to unity, corresponding to non-informative prior distributions
(Zhou et al., 2016), are assigned to the PMFs of root nodes, i.e. β0, β2, 𝛾0′, 𝛾2′, X0 and ΔX,
prior to carrying out the parameter learning on them.
The node Sj (j = 0, 1, 2, 3) has binary states (i.e. survival and failure); the probability of the
failure state is the cumulative failure probability of the defect under the internal pressure
up to year j. Note that the value of S3 is of primary interest, as it is the predicted cumulative
failure probability up to year 3 by taking into account the defect growth model updated
based on the ILI data at years 0 and 2. While both leak and burst failure modes (Zhou,
2010) can be considered, only the burst failure mode is included in the present model for
simplicity.
The limit state function, g, considered in the evaluation of CPT of Sj is given by,
𝑔 = 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑜𝑝

𝑟𝑏 = 𝜅

(2.9)

2𝑤𝑡 (𝜎𝑦 +68.95)
𝐷

𝑑
𝑤𝑡
𝑑
1−0.85
𝑀𝑤𝑡

[

√1 + 0.6275

1−0.85

𝑙2

𝐷𝑤𝑡
𝑀={
𝑙2
3.3 + 0.032 𝐷𝑤
𝑡

]

(2.10)

𝑙2

− 0.003375 (𝐷𝑤 )
𝑡

2

𝑙 ≤ √50𝐷𝑤𝑡

(2.11)

𝑙 > √50𝐷𝑤𝑡

where op is the operating pressure of the pipeline; 𝑟𝑏 is the burst pressure capacity of the
pipe at the defect, evaluated using the B31G Modified model (Kiefner and Veith, 1989); d
(i.e. Xj in the DBN model) is the actual defect depth; D is the pipe outside diameter; wt is
the actual pipe wall thickness; σy is the yield strength of the pipe steel; κ denotes the model
error associated with the B31G Modified model; M is the Folias bulging factor, and l is the
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defect length. Since all the relevant random variables (such as σy, D, and op) other than Xj
are assumed to have no observations for updating, they are treated as continuous random
variables and incorporated in the simple Monte Carlo simulation to develop the CPT of Sj
(Straub and Der Kiureghian, 2010); in other words, they are not explicitly considered in
the DBN growth model.
The PMFs of β0, 𝛾0′, β2, 𝛾2′, X0 and ΔX are developed by applying the parameter learning
technique based on two distinct datasets of corrosion defects, referred to as Datasets 1 and
2 respectively, consistent with the typical pipeline corrosion management practice. In
practice, once an ILI is conducted, pipeline engineers usually select a set of pipe joints to
be excavated almost immediately after the ILI (a pipeline consists of many pipe joints
welded together with each pipe joint about 12 – 20 m long) for the purpose of verifying the
accuracy of the ILI data as well as repairing those pipe joints containing critical defects,
i.e. defects with ILI-reported sizes exceeding the safety limit. The sizes of all the corrosion
defects on the excavated pipe joints are measured in the ditch using laser scans. Since laser
scans have negligible measurement errors (Al-Amin et al., 2012), the field-measured defect
sizes can be assumed to equal the corresponding actual defect sizes. Furthermore, all the
excavated pipe joints are repaired and recoated before reburied; therefore, the growth of
these corrosion defects is arrested after repair. Such defects are referred to as static defects.
The static defects will also be sized by ILIs conducted in the future. It follows that the
field-measured and ILI-reported depths for the static defects establish a dataset (i.e. Dataset
1) that is used to quantify the measurement errors associated with multiple sets of ILI data.
On the other hand, there are defects that have not been mitigated, referred to as active
defects. The depths of active defects reported by ILIs conducted at different times establish
Dataset 2, which is used to develop the growth model for the active defects. For the
example shown in Fig. 2.3, Dataset 1 includes a total of m1 static corrosion defects with
the ILI-reported depths and actual (i.e. field-measured) depths at time-slices 0 and 2, and
is used to learn the parameters of β0, β2, 𝛾0′ and 𝛾2′ using the EM algorithm, as illustrated in
Fig. 2.4(a). Figure 2.4(a) indicates that, in the first step of the parameter learning, the green
nodes (i.e. X0, Y0, X2 and Y2) in the DBN take samples from Dataset 1, and the parameters
of the yellow nodes (i.e. β0, β2, 𝛾0′ and 𝛾2′ ) are learned. Dataset 2 contains the ILI-reported
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defect depths at time-slices 0 and 2 for m2 active corrosion defects, and is used to learn the
parameters of X0 and ΔX as illustrated in Fig. 2.4(b), given the parameters of β0, β2, 𝛾0′ and
𝛾2′ learned from Dataset 1. Figure 2.4(b) indicates that, in the second step of the parameter
learning, the orange nodes (i.e. Y0 and Y2) take samples from Dataset 2, and the parameters
of the blue nodes (i.e. X0 and ΔX) are learned.
Time-slice 1

Time-slice 2

Time-slice 3

Nodes taking samples from Dataset 1

ΔX

ΔX

ΔX

Nodes with PMFs learned from Dataset 1

Time-slice 0

S1

S0
X0
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p = 1, 2,
m1
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X1
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(a) Step 1: Learn the parameters of βi and 𝛾𝑖′ using Dataset 1
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ΔX

ΔX

Nodes with PMFs learned from Dataset 2
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(b) Step 2: Learn the parameters of X0 and ΔX using Dataset 2
Figure 2.4 Illustration of parameter learning in two sequential steps using Datasets
1 and 2
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2.4 Illustrative examples and model validation
This section first describes a numerical example involving simulated corrosion data to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed DBN model and parameter learning
technique by the means of comparing the learned parameters with the corresponding values
prescribed in the data simulation. Then, the DBN growth model is developed and validated
using real corrosion data.

2.4.1

Example 1: simulated corrosion data

This example considers a pipeline inspected by three ILI tools denoted by I-0, I-3 and I-6,
at years 0, 3 and 6, respectively. Each of Datasets 1 and 2 contains 100 defects. The actual
defect depths in Dataset 1 are generated as independent samples of a Weibull distribution
with the corresponding mean and coefficient of variation (COV) equal to 0.4wtn and 30%,
respectively, where wtn is the nominal pipe wall thickness. The actual depths in Dataset 2
at year 0 are independent samples of a Weibull distribution with the corresponding mean
and COV equal to 0.3wtn and 30%, respectively. The annual depth growths of the defects
in Dataset 2 are further generated as independent samples of a gamma distribution with the
corresponding mean and COV equal to 0.04wtn and 50%, respectively. The prescribed
parameters characterizing the measurement errors associated with the three ILI tools are
shown in Table 2.2. Note that truncations, if necessary, are performed in the process of
simulation such that the simulated actual and ILI-reported depths are within the range of 0
to wtn.
The DBN growth model consists of 7 time-slices, i.e. years 0 through 6 (Fig. 2.5) and is
implemented using the commercial BN software Netica®. The time-slices corresponding
to years 0, 3 and 6 contain nodes representing measurement errors and ILI-reported depths.
The failure probability of the defect is not evaluated for this example as the focus is on
validating the DBN model in terms of quantifying the ILI measurement errors and defect
growth rate; therefore, the failure probability node Sj (j = 0, 1, …, 6) is not included in the
model. The discretization schemes adopted for the random variables involved in the DBN
are summarized in Table 2.1. The lower and upper bounds of the random variables are
selected based on a combination of physical limits and subjective considerations. For
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example, the lower and upper bounds of the defect depth (Xj, j = 0, 1, …, 6) and ILIreported defect depth (Yi, i = 0, 3, 6) are 0 and 100%wtn, respectively, based entirely on the
physical limits.

For the same reason, the lower and upper bounds of the additive

measurement error associated with the ILI tool (𝛾𝑖′ , i = 0, 3, 6) are -100% and 100%wtn.
Fuller (1987) indicates that the multiplicative bias is generally less than 2. Therefore, the
range for βi (i = 0, 3, 6) is selected to be between 0 to 2.5. The lower bound of ΔX must be
zero, whereas its upper bound is subjectively defined to be 0.1wtn, considered more than
adequate for typical pipelines. To investigate the effect of the discretization scheme on the
parameter learning, three different sets of interval sizes for the discretization are
considered, as summarized in Table 2.1, with a smaller interval leading to a more refined
discretization scheme. Scheme 1 is considered as the baseline case, whereas schemes 2
and 3 are more and less refined than scheme 1, respectively.
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Figure 2.5 The DBN growth model for Example 1
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Table 2.1 Summary of the probable range of values and discretization schemes for
Example 1
Random
variable
ΔX
Xi
Yi
βi
𝛾𝑖′

Range of values
[0, 0.1] wtn
[0, 1] wtn
[0, 1] wtn
[0, 2.5]
[-1, 1] wtn

Discretization interval
Scheme 1
Scheme 2
Scheme 3
0.005 wtn
0.004 wtn
0.01 wtn
0.05 wtn
0.04 wtn
0.1 wtn
0.05 wtn
0.04 wtn
0.1 wtn
0.1
0.05
0.25
0.1 wtn
0.05 wtn
0.2 wtn

The CPTs for Xj (j = 0, 1, …, 6) and Yi (i = 0, 3, 6) are created using the MC simulation
with 100,000 trials. The EM-based parameter learning is implemented in Netica® to learn
the parameters of βi and 𝛾𝑖′ (i = 0, 3, 6), X0 and ΔX. The EM iteration is terminated if any
of the following two conditions is met: the difference between the average log-likelihood
per case in two consecutive iterations is less than 10-5, and the maximum number of
iterations reaches 1000.
Note that the variability in the simulated samples may introduce variability in results of the
parameter learning. Therefore, the data simulation and parameter learning are repeated 10
times following the common practice (Zhou et al., 2016) of examining the accuracy of the
parameter learning. The values of βi, γi and σi (i = 0, 3, 6) are learned by considering the
three discretization schemes, respectively. The mean value and standard deviation of the
learned values of βi, γi and σi (i = 0, 3, 6) calculated from the 10 trials are presented in Table
2.2. Note that in a given trial the learned value of βi is taken as the mean of the
corresponding learned (i.e. posterior) PMF, whereas the learned values of γi and σi are taken
as the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the learned PMF of 𝛾𝑖′ . The results
indicate that discretization schemes 1 and 2 achieve better accuracy than discretization
scheme 3. For βi, γi and σi learned under the discretization schemes 1 and 2, the slight
difference between the mean values of the 10 trials and prescribed values, together with
the small standard deviations of the 10 trials suggest that the parameters learned in all the
trails in general agree well with the prescribed values. While smaller discretization
intervals are used in discretization scheme 2 than scheme 1, the improvement on the
accuracy of the parameter learning is limited. On the other hand, the performance of the
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parameter learning using discretization scheme 3 is unsatisfactory.

Under the three

discretization schemes, the parameters of X0 and ΔX are learned (Table 2.3) using the EM
algorithm based on Dataset 2, i.e. the ILI-reported depths of 100 active defects, and learned
parameters of βi and 𝛾𝑖′ (i = 0, 3, 6). Similar to the results in Table 2.2, Table 2.3 indicates
that the learned means and COVs of X0 and ΔX under the discretization schemes 1 and 2
agree well with the corresponding prescribed values, i.e. mean and COV of the Weibull
distribution that is used to simulate X0, and mean and COV of the gamma distribution that
is used to simulate ΔX. However, in comparison with the prescribed values, the errors on
the learned values under the discretization scheme 3 are relatively large. In summary, the
above results suggest that discretization scheme 1 is adequate to achieve good accuracy for
the parameter learning in the presented study, and the parameter learning technique can
effectively infer the parameters involved in the corrosion growth model based on the fieldmeasured and ILI-reported defect depths at different times. Further validation of the
growth model by real-world data is presented in the following section.
Table 2.2 Prescribed and learned parameters for the ILI measurement errors in
Example 1
Prescribed values
β0
I-0 γ0 (wtn)
σ0 (wtn)
β3
I-3 γ3 (wtn)
σ3 (wtn)
β6
I-6 γ6 (wtn)
σ6 (wtn)
a

1.1
-0.05
0.07
0.8
0.15
0.1
1.2
-0.1
0.1

Values from parameter learning
Scheme 1
Scheme 2
Scheme 3
a
1.11 ± 0.05
1.10 ± 0.04
1.19 ± 0.03
-0.059 ± 0.015 -0.052 ± 0.018 -0.098 ± 0.002
0.079 ± 0.009 0.084 ± 0.005 0.084 ± 0.002
0.83 ± 0.07
0.82 ± 0.08
0.90 ± 0.04
0.137 ± 0.029 0.141 ± 0.030 0.109 ± 0.011
0.099 ± 0.010 0.093 ± 0.011 0.095 ± 0.012
1.19 ± 0.06
1.20 ± 0.05
1.20 ± 0.03
-0.094 ± 0.026 -0.101 ± 0.024 -0.101 ± 0.005
0.096 ± 0.011 0.096 ± 0.012 0.094 ± 0.008

“1.11 ± 0.04” means that the mean and standard deviation of the learned values of β0 from the ten
trials are 1.11 and 0.04, respectively. The same explanation applies to the results of the parameter
learning presented in Tables 2.2 through 2.4.
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Table 2.3 Prescribed and learned parameters of ΔX and X0 in Example 1

Prescribed values
Scheme 1
Learned
Scheme 2
values
Scheme 3

ΔX
Mean value
COV (%)
(wtn)
0.04
50
0.038 ± 0.002
46.4 ± 7.4
0.038 ± 0.002
47.8 ± 8.0
0.032 ± 0.003
40.7 ± 10.3

X0
Mean value
(wtn)
0.3
0.305 ± 0.011
0.302 ± 0.013
0.320 ± 0.014

COV (%)
30
29.9 ± 2.8
30.7 ± 3.5
26.2 ± 2.4

As defined before, Dataset 2 only contains ILI data. In practice, the population of corrosion
defects on a given pipeline segment is generally large. Therefore, the sample size of
Dataset 2 for a given pipeline segment is not of great concern. On the other hand, Dataset
1 includes field measurements. Since the cost of excavating a pipe joint is high (typically
$200,000), the sample size of Dataset 1 may be limited. Therefore, it is valuable to
investigate the sensitivity of the learning results for βi, γi and σi (i = 0, 3, 6) to the sample
size of Dataset 1. All else being equal, two additional sample sizes of Dataset 1 are
considered, namely 50 and 150, respectively. The data simulation and parameter learning
of βi, γi and σi (i = 0, 3, 6) are repeated for these two sample sizes. Table 2.4 compares the
results associated with the three different sample sizes, i.e. 50, 100 and 150. The results
indicate slight differences in the parameters learned based on the sample sizes of 100 and
150. However, the accuracy of the parameter learning for the sample size of 50 is relatively
poor. Therefore, to achieve relatively accurate quantification of the measurement errors in
ILI data, it is recommended that the sample size of Dataset 1 be around 100 or greater.
Table 2.4 Prescribed and learned parameters for the ILI measurement errors under
different sample sizes in Dataset 1 for Example 1
Prescribed values
β0
I-0 γ0 (wtn)
σ0 (wtn)
β3
I-3 γ3 (wtn)
σ3 (wtn)
β6
I-6 γ6 (wtn)
σ6 (wtn)

1.1
-0.05
0.07
0.8
0.15
0.1
1.2
-0.1
0.1

Values from parameter learning
100 samples
50 samples
150 samples
1.11 ± 0.05
1.15 ± 0.11
1.09 ± 0.04
-0.059 ± 0.015 -0.075 ± 0.045 -0.045 ± 0.017
0.079 ± 0.009 0.099 ± 0.010 0.079 ± 0.006
0.83 ± 0.07
0.87 ± 0.08
0.83 ± 0.07
0.137 ± 0.029 0.125 ± 0.030 0.139 ± 0.026
0.099 ± 0.010 0.114 ± 0.010 0.102 ± 0.007
1.19 ± 0.06
1.07 ± 0.10
1.19 ± 0.05
-0.094 ± 0.026 -0.054 ± 0.040 -0.093 ± 0.020
0.096 ± 0.011 0.109 ± 0.014 0.099 ± 0.009
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2.4.2

Example 2: real corrosion data

In this section, the DBN is employed to quantify the growth of the defect depth with real
ILI and field measurement data from a pipeline that was constructed in 1972 and is
currently in service in Alberta, Canada. The pipeline has a nominal wall thickness of 5.56
mm and outside diameter of 508 mm, and is made of API 5L Grade X52 steel with a
nominal yield strength of 359 MPa and a nominal operating pressure of 5.66 MPa. The
pipeline was inspected by two different ILI tools in 2004 and 2007, respectively. A set of
corroded pipe joints were excavated and recoated between 2002 and 2004, and the sizes of
128 corrosion defects on the excavated pipe joints were measured on the site. Therefore,
the field-measured depths before 2004 and ILI-reported depths in 2004 and 2007 of the
128 static corrosion defects constitute Dataset 1 (Fig. 2.6(a)). Dataset 2 (Fig. 2.6(b))
contains the depths of 62 defects reported by the ILIs in 2004 and 2007, respectively. The
defects in Dataset 2 were repaired in 2010, and their depths were measured on site during
the repair. Dataset 2 is used to estimate the annual growth of the defect depth, and the
field-measured depth in 2010 are used to validate the predictive accuracy of the growth
model. Figure 2.6(b) also depicts the growth paths for the 62 defects by linking the ILIreported depths in 2004 and 2007, and field-measured depth in 2010 belonging to the same
defect. Note that corrosion growth is a monotonically increasing process. However, due
to the measurement errors on the ILI-reported depths, the growth paths indicated in Fig.
2.6(b) do not necessarily increase monotonically over time. The two datasets have been
used in a previous study (Al-Amin et al., 2012) employing Bayesian models and the
MCMC technique to quantify the measurement errors associated with ILI tools and growth
of defect depth.
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Figure 2.6 Data used for model development and validation for Example 2
A DBN-based growth model (Fig. 2.7) is developed and includes seven time-slices (i.e.
years 2004 through 2010).

The random variables are discretized following the

discretization scheme 1 as presented in Table 2.1. Dataset 1 is used to learn the PMFs for
′
′
β2004 and β2007 (Fig. 2.8(a)), 𝛾2004
and 𝛾2007
(Fig. 2.8(b)), associated with the ILI tools used
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in 2004 and 2007, respectively, whereas Dataset 2 is used to learn the PMFs for ΔX (Fig.
2.8(c)) and X2004 (Fig. 2.8(d)). The mean and COV of ΔX corresponding to the learned
PMF are 0.00618wtn and 178%, respectively. The mean and COV of X2004 corresponding
to the learned PMF are 0.291wtn and 41%, respectively. Figure 2.9 depicts the average
negative log-likelihood per case for Datasets 1 and 2 as a function of the number of
iterations in the EM algorithm, which indicates that convergence is achieved typically after
about 20 iterations. The learned values of β2004, γ2004, σ2004, β2007, γ2007 and σ2007 are
compared with the results reported by Al-Amin et al. (2012) in Table 2.5. The results
obtained in the present study and Al-Amin et al. (2012) are generally consistent; the
difference between the results may be explained by the following two reasons. First, β2004,
γ2004, σ2004, β2007, γ2007 and σ2007 are continuous random variables in the Bayesian model
′
′
employed in Al-Amin et al. (2012), whereas β2004, 𝛾2004
, β2007 and 𝛾2007
are discretized in

the present study. Second, informative prior distributions were assigned to β2004 and β2007
in Al-Amin et al. (2012), whereas the parameter learning in the DBN is performed based
on non-informative prior distributions.
Table 2.5 Comparison of the values of βi, γi, σi obtained in the present study and AlAmin et al. (2012) in Example 2
Parameter Learned values in the present study
β2004
γ2004(wtn)
σ2004 (wtn)
β2007
γ2007(wtn)
σ2007 (wtn)

0.85
0.056
0.063
1.36
-0.139
0.067

Posterior mean values reported in
Al-Amin et al. (2012)
0.97
0.020
0.060
1.40
-0.153
0.091
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Figure 2.7 The DBN growth model developed for Example 2
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Figure 2.8 Results of parameter learning for Example 2
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Figure 2.9 Convergence curve of parameter learning for Example 2
The developed DBN is used to predict the growth of the defect depth. The learned PMF
for ΔX from Dataset 2 is considered representative of the common features shared by all
the defects in the dataset and therefore used as the prior distribution of the growth rate for
all the defects in Dataset 2. To predict the growth path of a specific defect in Dataset 2,
the ILI-reported depths in 2004 and 2007 are used to instantiate the corresponding nodes
to evaluate the posterior distributions of X2004, X2007 and ΔX for the defect. The defect depth
in years after 2007 can then be predicted from X2007 and ΔX based on the linear growth
model. Figure 2.10(a) compares the posterior mean depths and corresponding fieldmeasured depths in 2010 for the 62 defects in Dataset 2. One-standard-deviation intervals
of model-predicted depths are also included to characterize the uncertainty associated with
the predictions. The results show that the majority (i.e. 85%) of the predictions lie in the
region bounded by the lines representing the prediction errors of ±10%wtn. The regression
line between the mean predicted depth and field-measured depth is plotted in Fig. 2.10(a),
where E[X], X and R2 denote the mean predicted depth, field-measured depth and
coefficient of determination of the regression line between E[X] and X, respectively. The
value of R2, i.e. 0.701, indicates a relatively strong correlation between E[X] and X. This
good predictive accuracy validates the modeling and parameter learning of the DBN
growth model. Figure 2.10(a) shows that the depths of a few deep defects are under-
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predicted by the DBN model, which can lead to non-conservatism in the corrosion
mitigation decision-making in practice. To address this issue, the 95-percentiles of the
posterior defect depths (as opposed to the posterior mean depths) can be adopted as the
predicted defect depths, as illustrated in Fig. 2.10(b). The figure indicates that the
predictive accuracy for the deep defects is improved, albeit at a price of increased
conservatism in the overall prediction.
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Figure 2.10 Predicted and actual defect depths in 2010 for Example 2
Table 2.6 Probabilistic characteristics of random variables of the pipeline (Zhou,
2010) in Example 2
Variable
l (mm)
D (mm)
wt (mm)
σy (MPa)
op (MPa)
κ

Distribution
Normal
Deterministic
Normal
Lognormal
Gumbel
Gumbel

Mean
75
508
5.56
395
5.66
1.2

COV (%)
20
1.5
3.5
3.0
20

The developed DBN model is further used to predict the time-dependent failure probability
of the pipeline at a defect given the ILI-reported depths as evidence. The failure probability
is output through the node Si in the DBN. While modeling the growth of the defect length
can be handled by the DBN in the same way as the defect depth, the growth of the defect
length is ignored for simplicity in this example. The probabilistic characteristics of the
variables that are used to develop the CPT for Si are summarized in Table 2.6. Using ILI
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data to instantiate the nodes Y2004 and Y2007, the cumulative failure probabilities of three
representative defects in Dataset 2 evaluated by the DBN are shown in Figs. 2.11(a),
2.11(b) and 2.11(c), respectively.
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Figure 2.11 Failure probabilities calculated by the DBN model for three
representative defects in Example 2

2.5 Conclusions
A DBN model is developed to quantify the growth of depths of corrosion defects on
pipelines and predict the time-dependent failure probabilities of the pipeline at individual
defects. The defect growth is assumed to be linear in time with a constant but uncertain
growth rate. The EM algorithm in the context of the parameter learning technique is
employed to evaluate parameters in the DBN based on the ILI-reported and field-measured
defect depths. The failure probability of the defect at each time-slice is evaluated in the
DBN to facilitate the updating of the failure probability based on the ILI data. The
effectiveness of the parameter learning for the DBN model is validated by the numerical
example. The application of the proposed model to real ILI and field-measured data shows
that the predicted defect depths in general agree well with the field-measured depths, and
the time-dependent failure probability can be evaluated effectively and efficiently by using
ILI data to instantiate corresponding nodes in the model. The developed model is
advantageous in the following three respects.

First, the defect growth modeling,
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quantification of measurement errors associated with ILI tools and failure probability
evaluation are integrated into a single model. Second, the parameter learning technique
allows parameters of the DBN model to be quantified in an automated and objective
manner. Third, the efficient inference algorithm of DBN enables the model updating to be
completed highly efficiently. These advantages make the model more accessible to nonspecialists in Bayesian data analysis and facilitate the reliability-based corrosion
management of oil and gas pipelines.
Sensitivity analyses suggest that the sample size of Dataset 1 should be around 100 or
greater to ensure the accuracy of the parameter learning results with respect to the ILI
measurement errors. This condition may not be easily met if the pipeline contains a small
number of critical defects that have been excavated for mitigation. Analysis results for
Example 2 indicate that posterior mean depths of the DBN model tend to under-predict the
depths of some deep defects. This issue can be addressed by using the 95-percentile of the
posterior defect depth as the predicted depth, although with increased conservatism in the
overall prediction. Finally, a simple linear corrosion growth model is adopted in the
present study. More sophisticated growth models such as the power-law and gamma
process-based models can be incorporated into the DBN without much difficulty.
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3

Bayesian network model for predicting probability of thirdparty damage to underground pipelines and learning model
parameters from incomplete datasets

3.1 Introduction
The historical pipeline incident data indicate that the mechanical damage from excavations
by third parties is one of the leading threats to the structural integrity of buried pipelines
(Lam and Zhou, 2016; EGIG, 2018). A third party is neither a pipeline operator nor a
contractor hired by the operator to service the pipeline; in other words, a third party is an
individual or organization unrelated to pipeline assets. About 26% of the pipe-related
incidents on onshore gas transmission pipelines in the United States resulted from thirdparty excavations between 2002 and 2013, almost equal to the number of incidents caused
by external and internal corrosions combined (Lam and Zhou, 2016); the third-party
damage is the leading threat to gas transmission pipelines in Europe and accounted for
28.4% of all the gas pipeline incidents between 1970 and 2016 (EGIG, 2018). Therefore,
the pipeline industry and regulatory agencies are devoting significant efforts to preventing
pipelines from being damaged by third-party excavations. Commonly used preventative
measures for the third-party damage (TPD) include, for example, the one-call system (third
parties notify the pipeline operators through one-call centers before excavations), warning
signs along the pipeline right-of-way (ROW), regular patrol of ROW, and supervision of
excavations by personnel of pipeline operators. Protective measures for TPD include the
burial depth of pipelines and physical protection such as concrete slabs buried above the
pipeline alignment.

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

(PHMSA) of the US Department of Transportation and common ground alliance (CGA)
have been using the damage information reporting tool (DIRT) to collect data regarding
the damage of underground utilities including pipelines to facilitate the analysis of the
effectiveness of preventative and protective measures against TPD.
The reliability-based pipeline integrity management program with respect to TPD is being
increasingly adopted by pipeline operators to deal with uncertainties associated with the
occurrence of TPD events (Koduru and Nessim, 2017). A key task in such a program is to
estimate the hit rate due to third-party excavations, which is the product of the rate of
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excavation activities (typically expressed in terms of per year per kilometer of pipeline)
and probability of hit given a third-party activity (Chen and Nessim, 1999; Chen et al.,
2006; Koduru and Lu, 2016; Lu and Stephen, 2016). The activity rate is estimated from
the observed third-party activities occurred in the vicinity of the pipeline alignment. A
fault tree model developed by Chen and Nessim (1999) has been widely employed by the
pipeline industry to estimate the probability of hit. The fault tree models a pipeline being
hit by a third-party excavation as the result of failures of all the preventative and protective
measures such as the third party failing to notify the pipeline operator before the
excavation, excavation undetected by the ROW patrol and excavation depth exceeding the
burial depth of the pipeline. Various improvements of the original fault tree developed by
Chen and Nessim (1999) have been proposed since its development. Chen et al. (2006)
enhanced the fault tree model by taking into account a broader range of preventative and
protective measures typically used in the pipeline industry. Lu and Stephens (2016)
classified third-party activities into authorized activities (AAs) and unauthorized activities
(UAs) based on whether or not the pipeline operator’s permission has been obtained prior
to the start of the excavation. They then developed a hierarchical fault tree model to
evaluate the probability of hit as the weighted sum of the probabilities of hit due to
authorized and unauthorized activities.
The failures of individual preventative and protective measures are the basic events of the
fault tree models reported in the literature (Chen and Nessim, 1999; Lu and Stephens,
2016).

Chen and Nessim (1999) carried out an industry-wide survey to estimate

probabilities of basic events, generally as functions of relevant pipeline attributes (e.g.
patrol frequency, pipeline burial depth, dig notification response time). In the practice of
TPD management over the past few decades, pipeline operators have collected a substantial
amount of TPD related data such as the individual TPD activities including the information
of pipeline attributes, prevention measures and consequences of the TPD activities, and it
is highly desirable to use the collected data to estimate the probabilities of basic events.
However, the nature of the fault tree analysis, i.e. top-down deduction, and the fact that the
collected TPD data generally contain missing information, i.e. the so-called incomplete
data, present significant challenges to the probability updating within the fault tree
framework.
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Fault tree models can be straightforwardly mapped to corresponding Bayesian Networks
(BNs) (Bobbio et al., 2001; Khakzad et al., 2011), which are well suited for inference and
probability updating based on observed data. However, there is limited literature on the
use of BNs to evaluate the probability of hit. Koduru and Lu (2016) developed a BN model
to evaluate the probability of hit based on the fault tree model reported in Chen et al. (2006).
They used the information in the DIRT report to evaluate probabilities of basic events in
the BN model. However, since participants of the DIRT program report the TPD data only
if third-party incidents are detected, the TPD data in the DIRT report are conditional on the
occurrence of pipelines being hit. To estimate the unconditional probability of a basic
event, Koduru and Lu (2016) manually adjusted its probability iteratively until the
probability of the event conditional on a hit equals the probability estimated from the DIRT
report. Such an approach for evaluating the probability of the basic event is highly
inefficient. Furthermore, it is very difficult, if possible at all, to estimate the probabilities
of multiple basic events simultaneously using this approach.
Extensive studies in the area of artificial intelligence have demonstrated that the parameter
learning technique associated with BNs provides an automated and objective means to
estimate a large number of parameters of BNs from observed data, particularly incomplete
data (Heckerman, 1998; Liao and Ji, 2010; Masegosa et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2016). The
TPD-related data (i.e. individual cases of third-party activities) collected by the pipeline
industry generally contain incomplete information for estimating the failure probabilities
of preventative and protective measures against third-party excavations. The present study
considers two typical incomplete datasets that consist of individual third-party activities
and proposes to employ the parameter learning technique of BN to learn the probabilities
mentioned above. To this end, a BN model for evaluating the probability of hit given a
third-party activity is first developed based on the fault tree commonly used by the pipeline
industry (Chen and Nessim, 1999; Lu and Stephens, 2016), whereby the probabilities to be
learned are converted to the parameters of the BN model. The Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm in the context of parameter learning is then employed to learn the
parameters of the BN from two TPD datasets.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the fault tree
model widely used to evaluate the probability of hit given a third-party activity. Section
3.3 presents the development of the BN based on the fault tree described in Section 3.2,
incomplete datasets provided by the pipeline industry, and EM algorithm for the parameter
learning. Section 3.4 demonstrates the effectiveness of the parameter learning through a
numerical example involving simulated TPD data and an application using real-world TPD
datasets, followed by conclusions in Section 3.5.

3.2 Fault tree model for evaluating the probability of hit
A fault tree is a top-down deductive tool to evaluate the probability of failure of a system
that is attributed to failures of multiple components of the system (Mearns, 1965). In a
fault tree, the system failure is the top event; events that result from occurrences of other
events are called intermediate events, and events that cannot be broken down into other
events are called basic events. The relationship between higher-level and lower-level
events is characterized by Boolean logic, i.e. the “or” and “and” gates. The higher-level
and lower-level events associated with a gate are called the output and input events of the
gate, respectively. For the “or” gate, the output event occurs if any of the input events
occurs; for the “and” gate, the output event occurs only if all of the input events occur.
Once the probabilities of basic events are input into the fault tree, the probability of the top
event can be evaluated by transmitting the probabilities through the gates using the
following two rules,
𝑝and = ∏𝑛𝑖=1 𝑝𝑖

(3.1)

𝑝or = 1 − ∏𝑛𝑖=1(1 − 𝑝𝑖 )

(3.2)

where pand and por are the probabilities of the output event of the “and” and “or” gates,
respectively; pi is the probability of the i-th input event of the gate, and n is the total number
of input events of the gate.
A fault tree for calculating the probability of hit (Ph) given a third-party activity (Fig. 3.1)
is adapted from the fault tree model developed by Chen and Nessim (1999). The fault tree
model is developed through a top-down process as follows. The top event (T0) represents
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a pipeline being hit by a third-party activity, which is connected to the ineffectiveness of
all the preventative measures (E7) and the only protective measure considered in the fault
tree, i.e. excavation depth exceeding the cover depth of the pipeline (B9). As E7 and B9
must both occur to result in the pipeline hit, they are connected to T0 via the “and” gate.
The event E7 is linked via the “or” gate to event B8 (accidental hit due to insufficient
excavation practice for the correctly located pipeline) and event E6 (the pipeline incorrectly
located and marked by the operator). The event E6 is linked via the “or” gate to event B7
(the operator aware of the activity but failing to locate the pipeline correctly) and event E5
(the operator unaware of the activity). The “and” gate links E5 to event E4 (the excavation
being unauthorized) and event B6 (the UA undetected by the ROW patrol). A UA results
either from the operator not notified by the one-call system (E3), or from the third-party
starting the excavation prior to the operator’s response to the one-call notification (B5).
The “or” gate links E3 to B4 (the one-call center failing to notify the operator when
contacted by the third-party) and E2 (the one-call center not contacted by the third-party).
The “and” gate links E2 to E1 (one-call not made while the excavator on ROW) and B1
(one-call not made before the operator mobilizing to ROW), and finally E1 is linked via the
“or” gate to B2 (ROW signs not recognized by the excavator) and B3 (ROW signs ignored
by the excavator). It follows that the fault tree model contains nine basic events, i.e. B1
through B9, and seven intermediate events, i.e. E1 through E7.
Once the probabilities B1 through B9 are input into the fault tree, the probabilities of E1
through E7 as well as the top event T0 are evaluated by transmitting probabilities based on
the rules given by Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2). The probabilities of basic events are defined as
functions of pipeline attributes such as the burial depth, ROW patrol frequency, and public
awareness of the one-call system (Chen and Nessim, 1999) as summarized in Table 3.1.
The values of pipeline attributes denoted by A1 through A9 are summarized in Table 3.2.
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T0: Pipeline hit by a
third-party activity

and

E7: Preventative
measures ineffective

B9: Excavation
depth exceeding
burial depth

or

E6: Pipeline
insufficiently located

B8: Insufficient
excavation
practice

or

E5: Operator not
aware of excavation

B7: Pipeline
incorrectly
located

and

E4: Unauthorized
activity

B6: Excavation
not detected
by patrol

or

E3: One-call
ineffective
B5: Excavation
prior to response

or

E2: One-call not used

B4: Call center not
notifying
operators

and

E1: No call while on
ROW

B1: No call before
mobilizing to
ROW

or

B2: ROW signs
not
recognized

B3: ROW signs
ignored

Figure 3.1 Fault tree model to evaluate Ph given a third-party activity
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Table 3.1 Description of the dependence of basic events on pipeline attributes
Basic event
B1: No call before
mobilizing to ROW
B2: ROW signs not
recognized
B3: ROW signs
ignored
B4: Call center not
notifying operators
B5: Excavation prior
to response
B6: Excavation not
detected by patrol
B7: Pipeline
incorrectly located
B8: Insufficient
excavation practice
B9: Excavation depth
exceeding burial
depth

Pipeline attributes influencing the probability of the basic
event
A1: Dig notification requirement; A2: Public awareness level
of one-call; A4: One-call type
A2: Public awareness level of one-call; A3: ROW spacing
A2: Public awareness of one-call; A4: One-call type
A4: One-call type
A5: Response time to dig notification
A6: Patrol frequency
A7: Locating method
A8: Response method to notification
A9: Burial depth
Table 3.2 Values of pipeline attributes

Pipeline attributes
A1: Dig notification
requirement
A2: Public awareness
level of one-call
A3: ROW spacing
A4: One-call type
A5: Response time to
dig notification
A6: Patrol frequency
A7: Locating method
A8: Response method
to notification
A9: Burial depth

Values
Not required; Required but not enforced; Required and
enforced
Below average; Average; Above average
Intermittent and/or very limited indication; Continuous but
limited indication; Continuous and highly indicative
Multiple systems; Unified system to minimum standard;
Unified system
One day; Two days; Three days
Twice daily; Daily; Three times per week; Twice per week;
Weekly; Bi-weekly; Monthly; Quarterly; Three times per
year; Semi-annually
Company records; Magnetic techniques
Provide location information only; Locate/mark/site
supervision
0.6 m, 0.7 m, …, 2.0 m

53

3.3 BN modeling, TPD datasets and parameter learning
3.3.1

BN modeling based on the fault tree

A BN is a directed graphical model representing the joint probabilistic distribution of a set
of random variables that are symbolized by nodes. The dependence between nodes is
symbolized by directed arcs and quantified by conditional probability tables (CPTs)
attached to nodes. The entries in the CPT are called parameters of the corresponding node.
The assignment of observed values to the corresponding nodes is called the instantiation
of the nodes, which can lead to the Bayesian updating of the nodes that are dependent on
the instantiated nodes. As an example, consider the BN model shown in Fig. 3.2. The
nodes X1 and X2 with arcs pointing to node X3 are the parents of X3, and X3 is the child node
of X1 and X2. The nodes X1 and X2 are called the root nodes, as they do not have parent
nodes. The CPT of the root node coincides with its probability mass function (PMF).
Details of the BN modeling and efficient inference algorithms such as the junction tree
algorithm for BNs are described in many textbooks, e.g. Nielsen and Jensen (2009) and
Pearl (2004).

X1

X2

X3

X4

Figure 3.2 An example BN
Figure 3.3 shows the BN model that is developed in the commercial software Netica® based
on the fault tree model in Fig. 3.1. Note that the fault tree model does not include the
pipeline attributes An (n = 1, 2, …, 9), whereas these attributes are explicitly modeled as
the parent nodes of basic events Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 9) in the BN model (gray nodes in Fig.
3.3). The conditional probabilities of the basic events are entries in the CPTs attached to
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corresponding nodes. Nodes Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 9), Em (m = 1, 2, …, 7) and T0 have binary
states “Yes” and “No”, and the marginal probability associated with the state “Yes”
represents the probability of the corresponding event. The following three examples are
used to illustrate the BN modeling of three types of dependences involved in the fault tree,
respectively. Figure 3.4 illustrates the BN modeling of the dependence of basic events Bi
(i = 1, 2, …, 9) on pipeline attributes An (n = 1, 2, …, 9). The conditional probabilities of
B7 given A7 are the parameters associated with the state “Yes” in the CPT attached to B7
as shown in Table 3.3. The BN models equivalent to the “or” and “and” gates of the fault
tree are shown in Figs. 3.5 and 3.6, respectively, and the corresponding CPTs attached to
the output events of the “or” and “and” gates are shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
Uniform PMFs are assigned to the nodes An (n = 1, 2, …, 9) to represent the noninformative
prior distributions for pipeline attributes before any information is available.
The BN model is a more flexible tool than the fault tree to predict Ph given a third-party
activity under different scenarios of available information. To predict Ph given a thirdparty activity with an unknown authorization status, one instantiates nodes A1 through A9
by the given pipeline attributes and obtains the probability associated with the state “Yes”
of the node T0. In practice, Ph values corresponding to authorized and unauthorized
activities respectively are often of interest (Lu and Stephen, 2016). To predict Ph given an
authorized activity, nodes A6 through A9 (as opposed to A1 through A9) are instantiated,
and node E4 is instantiated by the state “No”; to predict Ph given an unauthorized activity,
nodes A6 through A9 are instantiated, and node E4 is instantiated by the state “Yes”.
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T0: Pipeline hit by a third-party excavation
Yes
9.23
No
90.8

A9: Burial depth (m)
0.6
6.67
0.7
6.67
0.8
6.67
0.9
6.67
1.0
6.67
1.1
6.67
1.2
6.67
1.3
6.67
1.4
6.67
1.5
6.67
1.6
6.67
1.7
6.67
1.8
6.67
1.9
6.67
2.0
6.67

B9: Excavation depth > burial depth
Yes
22.1
No
77.9

E6: Pipeline insufficiently located
Yes
28.1
No
71.9

E5: Operator not aware of excavation
Yes
15.9
No
84.1

E4: Unauthorized activity
Yes
21.7
No
78.3

B5: Excavation prior to response
Yes
11.0
No
89.0
A5: Response time to dig notification
One day
33.3
Two days
33.3
Three days
33.3

E7: Preventative measures ineffective
Yes
41.8
No
58.2

B7: Pipeline incorrectly located
Yes
14.5
No
85.5

B6: Excavation not detected by patrol
Yes
73.3
No
26.7

E3: One-call ineffective
Yes
12.0
No
88.0

B4: Call center not notifying operators
Yes
1.17
No
98.8

B1: Not call before moblizing to ROW
Yes
21.6
No
78.4

B8: Insufficient excavation practice
Yes
19.0
No
81.0

E2: One-call not used
Yes
11.0
No
89.0

A8: Response method to notification
Locate/mark/site supervision 50.0
Provide route information
50.0
A7: Locating method
Company records
50.0
Magnetic techniques
50.0
A6: Patrol Frequency
Twice daily
10.0
Daily
10.0
Three times per week 10.0
Twice per week
10.0
Weekly
10.0
Bi-weekly
10.0
Monthly
10.0
Quarterly
10.0
Three times per year
10.0
Semi-annually
10.0

E1: No call while on ROW
Yes
47.5
No
52.5
B2: ROW signs not recognized
Yes
28.9
No
71.1

A1: Dig notification requirement
Not required (voluntary)
33.3
Required and enforced
33.3
Required but not enforced 33.3

A4: One-call type
Multiple
33.3
Unified to minimum standard 33.3
Unified
33.3

A2: Public awareness level of one-call
Above average
33.3
Average
33.3
Below average
33.3

B3: ROW signs ignored
Yes
28.0
No
72.0

A3: ROW spacing
Continuous/highly indicative
33.3
Continuous/limited indication 33.3
Intermittent/limited indication
33.3

Figure 3.3 BN for evaluating Ph given a third-party activity
A7: Locating method
Company records
50.0
Magnetic techniques
50.0

B7: Pipeline incorrectly located
Yes
14.5
No
85.5

Figure 3.4 BN modeling the dependence of B7 on A7
Table 3.3 CPT of node B7 in Fig. 4 based on the data in Chen and Nessim (1999)
Conditions
Conditional probabilities of node B7
States of A7
Company records
Magnetic techniques

State = “Yes”
0.2
0.09

State = “No”
0.8
0.91
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E3: One-call ineffective
Yes
75.0
No
25.0

E3: One-call
ineffective

or

B4: One-call
center not
notifying
operators

E2: One-call not used
B4: Call center not notifying operators
Yes
50.0
No
50.0

E2: One-Call not used
Yes
50.0
No
50.0

Figure 3.5 BN modeling of the “or” gate
Table 3.4 CPT of node E3 in Fig. 3.5
Conditions
Conditional probabilities of node E3
States of B4 States of E2
Yes
Yes
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
No

State = “Yes”
1
1
1
0

State = “No”
0
0
0
1

E5: Operator not aware of excavation
Yes
25.0
No
75.0

E5: Operator not
notified

and

E4: Unauthorized
activity

B6: Excavation
not detected
by patrol

E4: Unauthorized activity
Yes
50.0
No
50.0

B6: Excavation not detected by patrol
Yes
50.0
No
50.0

Figure 3.6 BN modeling of the “and” gate
Table 3.5 CPT of node E5 in Fig. 3.6
Conditions
Conditional probabilities of node E5
States of B6 States of E4
Yes
Yes
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
No

State = “Yes”
1
0
0
0

State = “No”
0
1
1
1
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3.3.2

TPD datasets for parameter learning

The pipeline company that provided the TPD data to the present study owns and operates
an extensive network of transmission pipelines in Canada, and has been applying the faulttree model to manage the TPD threat in the past decade. The company groups its pipeline
assets into seven TPD regions based on the geographic location of the pipeline. The
pipeline attributes denoted by nodes A1 through A9 in the BN model are the same for all
the pipelines within the same TPD region. The company has been keeping records of thirdparty activities that were either notified by one-call systems, detected by ROW patrols,
reported by landowners, or reported by the company employees since 2010. The records
provided to the present study cover the period from 2010 to 2016. A recorded third-party
activity is classified as unauthorized if one-call is not made or the excavation commences
prior to the company’s response to the one-call, which is consistent with the logic of the
fault tree (see the “or” gate involving E4, E3, and B5). Two datasets, referred to as Datasets
1 and 2, are extracted from these records for parameter learning. Dataset 1 consists of
individual cases of third-party activities and the information that each individual case is
classified as authorized or unauthorized activity, i.e. the values of A1 through A5 as well as
E4 in the BN model. As this dataset contains the information regarding the effectiveness
of one-call systems, it is used to learn the parameters of basic events B1 through B5. Dataset
2 consists of individual cases of UAs and the outcome of given UAs (i.e. pipeline hit or
not). That is, each case of Dataset 2 contains the values of A6 through A9, E3, and T0. Note
that, since the third-party activities in Dataset 2 are known as UAs, the value of E3 for every
case is “Yes”. As this dataset contains the information regarding the effectiveness of
preventative and protective measures against UA activities, they are used to learn the
parameters of basic events B6 through B9. It is noted that there is missing information in
both Datasets 1 and 2, specifically, the information about events Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 9), which
presents significant challenges to estimating the conditional probabilities of Bi (i = 1, 2, …,
9) given the values of An (n = 1, 2, …, 9). The EM algorithm presented in the next section
is employed to learn these conditional probabilities from Datasets 1 and 2.
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3.3.3

Parameter learning based on EM algorithm

Given the BN model described in Section 3.3.1, the task of estimating probabilities of the
basic events in the fault tree model is now a problem of learning parameters of the BN with
a known structure from incomplete datasets, more specifically, learning the parameters of
nodes Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 9) from two incomplete TPD datasets. The parameter learning is
performed in two steps. In the first step, the parameters of nodes B1 through B5 are learned
from Dataset 1; in the second step, the parameters of nodes B6 through B9 are learned from
Dataset 2.
As an example, the parameter learning of B1 through B5 is formulated as follows. While
the parameter learning in the present study is focused on the incomplete datasets, the
parameter learning based on the complete dataset is described first to improve the clarity
of the formulation. Let θi,j,k (i = 1, 2, …,5; j = 1, 2, …, ri; k = 1, 2) denote the parameters
of the node Bi, i.e. the probability of the k-th state (i.e. Yes or No) under the j-th parent
configuration, where ri is the total number of parent configurations of Bi. For a given parent
configuration j of Bi, θi,j,k (k = 1, 2) are considered as a vector of two random variables
following the Dirichlet distribution with hyperparameters αi,j,1 and αi,j,2.

The term

hyperparameter is used to distinguish αi,j,1 and αi,j,2 from the parameters of the BN model.
Before observations are obtained, the estimated value of θi,j,k, denoted by 𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 , can be set
to the corresponding mean values of the Dirichlet distribution:
𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 =

𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑘
𝛼𝑖,𝑗,0

(3.3)

where 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,0 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,1 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,2 is known as the equivalent sample size of the Dirichlet
distribution (Heckerman, 1998). Once a set of observations are obtained, the Bayesian
updating of the distribution of θi,j,k (j = 1, 2, …, ri) is carried out. Assume that there are a
total of n sets of observations (i.e. n cases), each of which contains the complete
information, i.e. values of An (n = 1, 2, …, 5) and Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 5). Let ni,j,1 and ni,j,2
denote numbers of observations of Bi in the state of “Yes” and “No”, respectively, under
the j-th parent configuration; ni,j,k (k = 1, 2) are considered drawn from a multinomial
distribution, of which the hyperparameters are θi,j,1 and θi,j,2.

Given the Dirichlet-
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multinomial conjugate pair, the posterior distribution of θi,j,k is also a Dirichlet distribution
(Heckerman, 1998) with parameters αi,j,1 + ni,j,1 and αi,j,2 + ni,j,2. With these observations,
𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 can be set to the mean of the posterior Dirichlet distribution, i.e.
𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 =

𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 +𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑘

(3.4)

𝛼𝑖,𝑗,0 +𝑛𝑖,𝑗,0

where 𝑛𝑖,𝑗,0 = 𝑛𝑖,𝑗,1 + 𝑛𝑖,𝑗,2 . This completes the parameter learning for Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 5)
under the complete data scenario.
Now consider the scenario of incomplete or missing data, i.e. parameter learning from
Dataset 1 described in Section 3.3.2. Assume that Dataset 1 contains a total of n cases.
The EM algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977) is commonly employed to learn the parameters
with incomplete data.

To this end, the posterior distribution of θi,j,k is a Dirichlet

distribution with parameters αi,j,1 + E[ni,j,1] and αi,j,2 + E[ni,j,2], where E[ni,j,1] and E[ni,j,2] are
the expected numbers of observations of Bi in the state of “Yes” and “No”, respectively,
under the j-th parent configuration. The value of E[ni,j,k] (k = 1 and 2) is calculated as
follows,
E[𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 ] = ∑𝑛𝑙=1 𝑝(𝑏𝑖,𝑘 , pa𝑖,𝑗 |𝑂𝑙 )

(3.5)

where bi,k and pa𝑖,𝑗 are the k-th state and j-th parent configuration of Bi, respectively, and
𝑝(𝑏𝑖,𝑘 , pa𝑖,𝑗 |𝑂𝑙 ) denotes the joint probability of bi,k and pa𝑖,𝑗 given the l-th case (Ol) and
can be obtained from the Bayesian updating once the BN is instantiated by the evidence in
Ol, i.e. corresponding values of An (n = 1, 2, …, 5) and E3. The value of 𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 is now given
by,
𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 =

𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 +E[𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 ]
𝑟

𝑐 E[𝑛
𝛼𝑖,𝑗,0 +∑𝑗=1
𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 ]

(3.6)

It follows that the evaluation of Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6) is an iterative process, as 𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 obtained
in the current iteration is used to estimate E[𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 ] and thus leads to a new 𝜃̂𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 in the next
iteration. The iteration is terminated once the log-likelihood of the observations converges
to a local maximum, and this completes the parameter learning for Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 5) under
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the incomplete data scenario. The above formulation of EM algorithm applies equally to
the parameter learning for nodes B6 through B9 from Dataset 2.

3.4 Numerical example and case study
This section first uses a numerical example involving simulated TPD data to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the parameter learning for this specific BN model. Then, a case study
involving real-world TPD datasets, i.e. Datasets 1 and 2 described in Section 3.3.2, is
presented.

3.4.1

Numerical example involving simulated TPD data

This example is introduced following the common practice of examining the effectiveness
of parameter learning using simulated data in the literature (Masegosa et al., 2016; Liao
and Ji, 2010; Zhou et al., 2016). First, a baseline BN is developed as described in Section
3.3.1, for which the CPTs of nodes B1 through B9 are created based on the data in the
literature (Chen and Nessim, 1999; TransCanada Corporation, 2017). The parameters of
B1 through B9 of the baseline BN are considered the true parameters. Then, two datasets,
Datasets I and II consisting of individual cases of third-party activities are simulated using
the baseline BN as follows. Note that Datasets I and II are missing the same information
as that in Datasets 1 and 2, respectively, described in Section 3.3.2. To simulate Dataset I,
a prescribed number of individual cases of third-party activities are drawn from the baseline
BN model using the forward algorithm (Henrion, 1988), which is the standard sampling
algorithm implemented in the software Netica®. For each simulated case of third-party
activity in Dataset I, the values of A1 through A5 as well as E4 are kept, whereas the values
associated with the other nodes in the BN are removed, thus creating an incomplete dataset.
The individual cases of third-party activities in Dataset II are simulated by first instantiating
the state of node E4 as “Yes” (i.e. unauthorized activities only). Then, for each simulated
case, the values of A6 through A9, E4 and T0 are kept, whereas the values of the other nodes
are removed. For both Datasets I and II, five sample sizes are considered: 500, 1000, 1500,
2000 and 2500.
The parameter learning is carried out on a prior BN model, of which the structure and the
parameters associated with An (n = 1, 2, …, 9), Em (m = 1, 2, …, 7) and T0 are the same as
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the baseline model. However, the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with equivalent sample
size of unity is assigned to the parameters of Bi (i = 1, 2, …, 9) for given parent
configuration, that is, αi,j,1 = αi,j,2 = 0.5. This prior assumption is corresponding to the leastinformative Jeffreys prior (Kelly and Atwood, 2011). The EM algorithm is employed to
learn the parameters of B1 through B5, and B6 through B9 from Datasets I and II,
respectively. For a given node Bi, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the CPT
of the learned BN and CPT of the baseline BN is evaluated as a measure of the difference
between the two CPTs (Kullback and Leibler, 1951). The smaller is the KL-divergence,
the closer is the learned CPT to the true CPT, indicating more effective parameter learning.
To facilitate the observation, the normalized KL-divergence, Dp/Dπ, is used to express the
parameter learning results, where Dπ denotes the KL-divergence between the CPTs of the
prior BN and baseline BN, and Dp denotes the KL-divergence between the CPT of the
learned BN and baseline BN. It follows that Dp/Dπ less than unity is desirable. As the
variability in the simulated samples may introduce variability in the results of the parameter
learning, the simulation of the TPD dataset and corresponding parameter learning for a
given sample size are repeated 10 times. The mean value (vertical bar) and one-standarddeviation interval (error line on the vertical bar) of Dp/Dπ of the 10 trials for nodes B1
through B9 are depicted in Figs. 3.7(a) through 3.7(i), respectively. These figures indicate
that the values of Dp/Dπ associated with all the nodes are less than unity, demonstrating the
effectiveness of the parameter learning. In general, as the sample size increases, the mean
value and standard deviation of Dp/Dπ decrease, which indicates that the performance of
parameter learning is improved as the sample size increases.
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Figure 3.7 KL-divergence associated with nodes B1 through B9 in the numerical
example

3.4.2

Case study using real TPD data

In this section, parameter learning is applied to the prior BN to learn the parameters of node
B1 through B9 using Datasets 1 and 2 described in Section 3.3.2. The datasets are the thirdparty activities occurring on pipelines in seven TPD regions in Canada between 2010 and
2016. The TPD regions are denoted as R-1 through R-7, of which the pipeline attributes
are given in Appendix A. The number of AAs, UAs, and pipeline hits resulting from UAs
within R-1 through R-7 are shown in Figs. 3.8(a) through 3.8(c), respectively. Note that
there were no pipeline hits in R-5, R-6 and R-7 between 2010 and 2016. The TPD data
associated with Figs. 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) constitute Dataset 1, and TPD data associated with
Figs. 3.8(b) and 3.8(c) constitute Dataset 2.
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Figure 3.8 Number of pipeline hits caused by UAs per TPD region
The EM algorithm is implemented on a prior model that is the same as described in Section
3.4.1 to learn the parameters of B1 through B5 (i.e. nodes related to the effectiveness of
one-call) from Dataset 1, and B6 through B9 (i.e. nodes related to the effectiveness of
preventative and protective measures against UAs) from Dataset 2.

Since the true

parameters corresponding to the real-world datasets are unknown, the performance of the
parameter learning is examined indirectly by comparing the model-predicted probabilities
with corresponding empirical probabilities as follows. To examine the performance of the
parameter learning with respect to nodes B1 through B5, we compare the empirical and
model-predicted probabilities of a third-party activity being unauthorized. For a given TPD
region, the model-predicted value is the probability associated with the state “Yes” of node
E4 by instantiating nodes A1 through A5 with the corresponding pipeline attributes shown
in Appendix A. The empirical value is evaluated as the ratio of the number of UAs to the
total number of third-party activities (i.e. the sum of the numbers of UAs and AAs)
associated with the TPD region.

Figure 3.9 depicts the empirical probability and

probabilities predicted by the baseline BN and learned BN (i.e. parameters of B1 through
B5 obtained from the parameter learning) for the seven TPD regions. The figure indicates
that the probabilities predicted by the baseline BN model are in general two orders of
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magnitude higher than the empirical probabilities, whereas the probabilities predicted by
the learned BN model agree well with the empirical probabilities. Therefore, the parameter
learning has effectively elicited the parameters of nodes B1 through B5 from Dataset 1.

Probability of UA

1
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Prediction of baseline BN
Prediction of learned BN
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0.001
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Figure 3.9 Comparison of the empirical and model-predicted probability of a thirdparty activity being unauthorized
The second quantity used to examine the performance of the parameter learning with
respect to nodes B6 through B9 is Ph given a UA. As shown in Fig. 3.8(b), pipeline hits
caused by UAs are only observed on pipelines in R-1 through R-4; the empirical Ph given
a UA for each of these four TPD regions is evaluated as the ratio of the corresponding
number of hits to the total number of UAs observed. Since no pipeline hits are observed
for regions R-5 through R-7, the empirical Ph given a UA for these TPD regions is zero.
For a given TPD region, the model-predicted Ph given a UA is the probability associated
with the state “Yes” of node T0 by instantiating nodes A6 through A9 by the corresponding
pipeline attributes shown in Appendix A, and node E4 by the state “Yes”. The comparison
of the empirical probability and probabilities predicted by the baseline BN and learned BN
is shown in Fig. 3.10. This figure indicates that, for TPD regions R-1 through R-4, the
probabilities predicted by the baseline BN are generally one order of magnitude higher than
the corresponding empirical values, whereas the probabilities predicted by the learned BN
(i.e. parameters of B6 through B9 obtained from the parameter learning) agree well with the
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empirical values. For TPD regions R-5 through R-7, where no pipeline hits are observed,
the probabilities predicted by the baseline BN are comparable to those for regions R-1
through R-4, which is overly conservative. On the other hand, the probabilities predicted
by the learned BN for R-5 through R-7 are significantly lower than those for R-1 through
R-4, therefore more reflective of the reality.
1

Empirical value
Prediction of baseline BN

Ph given a UA

Prediction of learned BN
0.1

0.01

0.001
R-1

R-2

R-3

R-4

R-5

R-6

R-7

TPD region

Figure 3.10 Comparison of the model-predicted and empirical Ph given a UA

3.5 Conclusions
The present study proposes a BN model to evaluate the probability of pipelines being hit
by third-party excavation activities and apply the parameter learning technique to learn
CPTs of the BN model from TPD datasets. The BN model is developed based on a fault
tree model commonly used in the pipeline industry. The EM algorithm in the context of
parameter learning is employed to learn CPTs of the BN model from two incomplete
datasets consisting of individual cases of third-party activities. The effectiveness of the
parameter learning is first demonstrated by a numerical example involving simulated TPD
datasets, where the KL-divergence between the learned CPT and true CPT is adopted as
the metric. The effectiveness of the parameter learning is further demonstrated by using
two real-world TPD datasets collected by a Canadian pipeline operator between 2010 and
2016. The performance of the parameter learning is examined by comparing the empirical
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value and model-predicted value of two quantities: the probability of a third-party activity
being unauthorized and the probability of hit given a UA. The results indicate that the
probabilities predicted by the BN with the parameters obtained from the parameter learning
agree well with the corresponding empirical values. Therefore, the techniques of BN
modeling and parameter learning provide an effective and efficient means to exploit the
historical TPD datasets collected by pipeline operators to improve the pipeline integrity
management practice with respect to TPD.

References
Bobbio, A., Portinale, L., Minichino, M., and Ciancamerla, E. (2001). Improving the
analysis of dependable systems by mapping fault trees into Bayesian
networks. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 71(3), 249-260.
Chen, Q., Davis, K., and Parker, C. (2006). Modeling damage prevention effectiveness
based on industry practices and regulatory framework. In: Proceedings of the 9th
International Pipeline Conference (pp. 635-645), Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Chen, Q., and Nessim, M. A. (1999). Reliability-based prevention of mechanical damage
to pipelines. Pipeline Research Council International, Project PR-244-9729.
Common Ground Alliance. (2016). DIRT analysis and recommendation, Volume 11.
Dempster, A., Laird, N., and Rubin, D. (1977). Maximum likelihood from incomplete data
via the EM algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical
Methodology), 39(1), 1-38.
European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG). (2018), 10th EGIG Report (period
1970-2016), Document number: VA 17.R.0395.
Heckerman, D. (1998). A tutorial on learning with Bayesian networks. Learning in
graphical models (pp. 301-354). Springer, Dordrecht.
Henrion, M. (1988). Propagating uncertainty in Bayesian networks by probabilistic logic
sampling. Machine Intelligence and Pattern Recognition, 5, 149-163.
Kelly, D., and Atwood, C. (2011). Finding a minimally informative Dirichlet prior
distribution using least squares. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 96(3),
398-402.
Khakzad, N., Khan, F., and Amyotte, P. (2011). Safety analysis in process facilities:
Comparison of fault tree and Bayesian network approaches. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, 96(8), 925-932.
Koduru, S. D., and Lu, D. (2016). Equipment Impact Rate Assessment Using Bayesian
Networks. In Proceedings of the 11th International Pipeline Conference (pp.
V002T07A013-V002T07A013), Calgary, Alberta, Canada.

69

Koduru, S. D., and Nessim, M. A. (2017). Review of Quantitative Reliability Methods for
Onshore Oil and Gas Pipelines. In Risk and Reliability Analysis: Theory and
Applications (pp. 67-95). Springer.
Kullback, S., and Leibler, R. A. (1951). On information and sufficiency. The annals of
mathematical statistics, 22(1), 79-86.
Lam, C., and Zhou, W. (2016). Statistical analyses of incidents on onshore gas transmission
pipelines based on PHMSA database. International Journal of Pressure Vessels
and Piping, 145, 29-40.
Liao, W., and Ji, Q. (2010). Learning Bayesian network parameters under incomplete data
with domain knowledge. Pattern Recognition, 42(11), 3046-3056.
Lu, D., and Stephens, M. (2016). Analyzing the Effectiveness of Prevention Measures for
Third-Party Damage to Underground Pipelines Using a Hierarchical Fault Tree
Model. In: Proceedings of the 11th International Pipeline Conference (pp.
V002T07A022-V002T07A022), Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Masegosa, A. R., Feelders, A. J., and van der Gaag, L. C. (2016). Learning from incomplete
data in Bayesian networks with qualitative influences. International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning, 69, 18-34.
Mearns, A. B. (1965). Fault tree analysis- the study of unlikely events in complex systems
(Fault tree analysis as tool to identify component failure as probable cause of
undesired event in complex system). In: System Safety Symposium, Seattle,
Washington.
Nielsen, T., and Jensen, F. (2009). Bayesian networks and decision graphs. New York,
NY: Springer Science and Business Media.
Pearl, J. (2004). Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible
inference. Elsevier.
TransCanada Corporation. (2017). System-wide risk assessment (SWRA) - Appendix D:
Third-party external interference. Calgary, Canada.
Zhou, Y., Fenton, N., and Zhu, C. (2016). An empirical study of Bayesian network
parameter learning with monotonic influence constraints. Decision Support
Systems, 87, 69-79.

70

4

A non-parametric Bayesian network model for predicting
corrosion depth on buried pipelines

4.1 Introduction
Historical failure data indicate that metal-loss corrosion is one of the major threats to the
structural integrity of underground oil and gas pipelines (CEPA, 2015; Lam and Zhou,
2016). Since the corrosion deterioration on buried pipelines is greatly influenced by the
corrosive properties of surrounding soils, characterizing the correlation of corrosion sizes
with relevant local soil parameters has received a great deal of attention in the research
community (Caleyo et al, 2009; Jyrkama et al., 2016; Melchers and Petersen, 2018; Ricker,
2010; Velázquez et al., 2009). Predicting the corrosion depth based on soil properties is of
great practical value to the corrosion assessment of buried pipelines to which in-line
inspection (ILI) technique is infeasible, i.e. unpiggable pipelines (Beauregard et al., 2018).
Many models to predict corrosion depths using soil parameters as predictors have been
reported in the literature during the past several decades (Romanoff, 1957; Velázquez et
al., 2009; Caleyo et al, 2009; Ricker, 2010; Alamilla et al., 2009; Yajima et al., 2015;
Wang et al., 2016). Most of these models were developed based on multivariate regression
analyses of corrosion datasets reported in the open literature such as the National Bureau
of Standards (NBS) dataset (Romanoff, 1957) and dataset reported by Velázquez et al.
(2010) (referred to as Velázquez’s dataset hereafter). The NBS dataset was collected from
extensive field studies of corrosion on a variety of ferrous specimens including pipelines
buried in 128 sites with representative soils across the United States for up to 17 years
(Romanoff, 1957). This dataset contains the measurements of the deepest corrosion depths
on experimental specimens together with a group of local soil parameters. The analysis of
the corrosion data indicated that the growth path of the corrosion depth follows a powerlaw function of exposure time with the exponent parameter less than unity (Romanoff,
1957). Since then, extensive studies have been performed based on the NBS dataset to
investigate the correlation between the measured soil parameters and develop regression
models for predicting the corrosion depth (Jyrkama et al., 2016; Romanoff, 1956; Ricker,
2010; Schwerdtfeger, 1966). However, the analyses indicated a lack of strong correlation
between the corrosion depth and soil parameters (Jyrkama et al., 2016; Ricker, 2010).
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Ricker (2010) concluded that due to a lack of statistical considerations in the process of
designing the experiment, the multivariate regression analysis was not suitable to develop
predictive models using the NBS dataset. Velázquez’s corrosion dataset was collected
from 259 excavation sites of underground energy pipelines in southern Mexico, of which
each individual sample consists of the maximum corrosion depth in the excavation site (i.e.
the maximum corrosion depth on the exposed pipeline segment), age of the pipeline, and
local soil parameters (Velázquez et al., 2010).

The relatively large sample size of

Velázquez’s dataset makes it more suitable to use for statistical and probabilistic analysis
than the NBS dataset. Moreover, since Velázquez’s dataset was collected from real
pipelines instead of experimental specimens, it is considered more reflective of
characteristics of pipeline corrosion in reality than the NBS dataset. Using this dataset,
Velázquez et al. (2009) employed the power-law function to characterize the growth of
corrosion depth. The proportionality and exponent parameters of the power-law function
were assumed to be linear functions of soil parameters and determined by the multivariate
regression analysis.
The predictive regression models developed based on the corrosion datasets have a few
drawbacks. First, the functional forms of model parameters, such as the proportionality
and exponent parameters of the power-law function, in terms of soil parameters are usually
decided based on assumptions, which brings marked subjectivity into the developed
regression model. Second, due to the interaction of different soil parameters, analyses of
corrosion data often indicate a lack of strong correlation between the corrosion depth and
individual soil parameters (Jyrkama et al., 2016; Ricker, 2010; Velázquez et al., 2009).
This implies that deterministic models such as regression models are not appropriate to
characterize the relationship between corrosion depths and soil parameters. The inherent
spatial and temporal variability associated with the soil parameters and corrosion depths
further suggest that it is more appropriate and objective to characterize the relationship
between corrosion depth and soil parameters probabilistically than deterministically.
In the present study, the non-parametric Bayesian network (NPBN) technique (Kurowicha
and Cooke, 2005; Hanea et al., 2006) is employed to develop a probabilistic predictive
model for the corrosion depth based on Velázquez’s dataset. An NPBN is a directed acyclic
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graph (DAG) with nodes and arcs symbolizing a set of continuous random variables and
dependence between them, respectively. Due to the intuitive graphical nature and ability
to efficiently deal with continuous random variables, NPBNs have become increasingly
popular for the high dimensional dependence modeling and risk analysis (Zilko et al., 2016;
Morales-Napoles and Steenbergen, 2014; Hanea et al., 2015; Morale-Napoles et al., 2014;
Hanea et al., 2013; Lee and Pan, 2018; Wang et al., 2019). The model mining method,
established by Hanea et al. (2010) to facilitate the development of NPBN based on
multivariate datasets, is employed in the present study to develop an NPBN model, which
involves the corrosion depth and ten predictors including the pipeline age and local soil
parameters. Once the nodes representing predictor variables are instantiated, the developed
NPBN can infer the probabilistic distribution of the corrosion depth.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a brief
introduction to the theory of NPBN and mining method of developing NPBN from a
multivariate dataset. Section 4.3 formulates the NPBN model for predicting the corrosion
depth based on the Gaussian copula. An overview of Velázquez’s dataset is provided in
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 develops the NPBN predictive model using the Velázquez’s
dataset and validates the model by the means of 5-fold cross-validation, followed by
conclusions in Section 4.6.

4.2 Non-parametric Bayesian network and model mining method
4.2.1

Bayesian network, copula and non-parametric Bayesian network

A Bayesian network (BN) is a DAG of the joint probability distribution of a set of random
variables (Nielsen and Jensen, 2009). A BN consists of nodes representing the random
variables and directed arcs representing causal (i.e. parent-child) relationships between the
nodes. Through the conditional independence statements encoded in the graph, a highdimensional joint probability distribution can be represented as a factorization of a series
of conditional probability distributions, thus simplifying the computation. Given data or
evidence observed on a subset of the nodes in a BN, the joint probability distribution of the
rest of the nodes in the BN can be updated through Bayes’ theorem. This is the so-called
inference, the most important application of BNs.

Various exact and approximate
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inference algorithms are described in many textbooks (e.g. Nielsen and Jensen, 2009; Pearl,
2014). BNs are generally applicable to discrete random variables (Langseth et al., 2009):
the marginal and conditional distributions are defined through the probability mass
functions and conditional probability tables, respectively. Continuous random variables
are generally discretized to be included in a BN. If a significant number of continuous
random variables are however included in a BN, each of them discretized by a sufficiently
large number of states to ensure the computational accuracy, the efforts for specifying the
conditional probability tables can become prohibitively burdensome. The discretization
can be avoided if the continuous random variables are assumed to follow a jointly normal
distribution (Hanea et al., 2006); however, the joint normality assumption may not be
justified by reality.
NPBN is developed to overcome the above-described drawbacks of BN in dealing with
continuous random variables. Introduced by Kurowicka and Cooke (2005) and extended
by Hanea et al. (2006), an NPBN is a DAG with nodes and arcs symbolizing a set of
continuous random variables and dependence between them, respectively. The term “nonparametric” reflects the fact that copulas are used to couple marginal distributions of
random variables in NPBN, therefore eliminating the need to assume their joint probability
distribution. The dependence between any two nodes is quantified by the (conditional)
Spearman’s rank correlation, which is the correlation coefficient between ranks, i.e.
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), of the two variables.
Since the copula concept is central to NPBN, a brief description of copula is presented in
the following. A copula, C(u1, u2, …, un) = P(U1 ≤ u1, U2 ≤ u2, …, Un ≤ un), is a joint
probability distribution of standard uniformly distributed random variates Ui (i = 1, 2, …,
n). Sklar (1959) showed that any n-variate probability distribution function, F(x1, x2, …,
xn), can be written as the following copula form:
𝐶 (𝐹𝑋1 (𝑥1 ), 𝐹𝑋2 (𝑥2 ), … , 𝐹𝑋𝑛 (𝑥𝑛 )) = 𝐹(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 )

(4.1)

where 𝐹𝑋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) is the marginal CDF of random variable Xi (i = 1, 2, …, n) evaluated at the
value xi, and C(•) is the copula. Many copula functions have been developed, e.g. the
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Frechet, Clayton and Gaussian copulas (Nelsen, 2007). While any copula function can be
used in NPBN, the Gaussian copula is of particular importance to NPBN mainly because
it allows analytical inferences, which greatly improves the computational efficiency of
NPBN. The Gaussian copula is given by,
𝐶 (𝐹𝑋1 (𝑥1 ), 𝐹𝑋2 (𝑥2 ), … , 𝐹𝑋𝑛 (𝑥𝑛 )) =
Φ𝑛 (Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋1 (𝑥1 )) , Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋2 (𝑥2 )) , … . , Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋𝑛 (𝑥𝑛 )))

(4.2)

where Φn(•) is the n-variate normal distribution function with the (n×n)-dimensional linear
correlation matrix , and Φ-1(•) is the inverse of the standard univariate normal distribution
function. Let ρij (i, j = 1, 2, …, n) denote the elements of Σ, i.e. the linear correlation
coefficient between Ui and Uj (for brevity the term “linear” is omitted thereafter), where Ui
(Uj) corresponds to Xi (Xj) through the inverse normal transformation, and let rij denote the
rank correlation coefficient between Ui and Uj. Then ρij is related to rij through the
following equation (Pearson, 1907):
𝜋

𝜌𝑖𝑗 = 2 sin ( 6 𝑟𝑖𝑗 ) (i, j = 1, 2, …, n)

(4.3)

Consider the simple example of a DAG consisting of four nodes (Fig. 4.1) as described in
Hanea et al. (2006).

The four nodes represent four continuous random variables,

respectively, with the corresponding invertible marginal distributions. Note that if data are
available, the marginal distribution can be straightforwardly defined, e.g. using the
empirical CDF or parametric CDF obtained from distribution fitting techniques. Four rank
correlation coefficients are then assigned, respectively, to the four directed arcs in Fig. 4.1.
To this end, r13 and r24 define the unconditional rank correlation coefficients between nodes
1 and 3, and nodes 2 and 4, respectively. Since node 4 has two parents (2 and 3), the
conditional rank correlation concept is employed: r24 defines the unconditional rank
correlation coefficient between 2 and 4, whereas r34|2 defines the conditional rank
correlation coefficient between 3 and 4 given 2. It follows that the order of the factorization
is not unique, i.e. r34 and r24|3 being also valid specifications. The theorem developed by
Hanea et al. (2006) ensures that the joint distribution of the four random variables in Fig.
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4.1 is uniquely defined given the DAG and specifications of marginal distributions,
(conditional) rank correlation coefficients, and the copula function to link the marginal
distributions.

The (conditional) rank correlation coefficients defined as such are

algebraically independent, i.e. any numbers in (-1, 1) and consistent.

1

3

2

4

Figure 4.1 NPBN with four nodes and four arcs
If the Gaussian copula is used, then the (conditional) correlation coefficient can be
evaluated from the (conditional) rank correlation coefficient using Eq. (4.3). Furthermore,
the conditional correlation coefficient equals the partial correlation coefficient for the
Gaussian copula. For a set of n random variables X1, X2, …, Xn, the partial correlation
coefficient between X1 and X2 based on X3, …, Xn, denoted by ρ12;3,…,n, is geometrically
interpreted as the correlation between the projections of X1 and X2 on the plane orthogonal
to the space spanned by X3, …, Xn (Hanea, 2008; Zeng et al. 2017). Partial correlation
coefficients can be recursively computed from the correlation coefficients as follows:
𝜌12;3,…,𝑛 =

𝜌12;4,…,𝑛 −𝜌13;4,…,𝑛 ∙𝜌23;4,…,𝑛
2
2
)(1−𝜌23;4,…,𝑛
)
√(1−𝜌13;4,…,𝑛

(4.4)

Examples of using Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) to evaluate the conditional rank correlations given
the unconditional rank correlations, and inversely evaluate the unconditional rank
correlations based on the conditional rank correlations attached to the arcs of the NPBN
are included in Appendix B. Note that while the NPBN method is similar to the joint
normal transform, the NPBN method is advantageous in that (conditional) rank correlations
specified in an NPBN need not satisfy the algebraic constraint of positive definiteness as
the elements in the correlation matrix do (Kurowicka and Cooke, 2006).
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The above description suggests the following advantages of using the Gaussian copula in
NPBN. First, correlation coefficients can be determined from the (conditional) rank
correlation coefficients using Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) as well as the fact that the partial
correlation coefficient equals the conditional correlation coefficient for the Gaussian
copula.

Second, zero correlation (i.e. no arc) between two nodes is equivalent to

(conditional) independence between the variables for the Gaussian copula. Third, the
correlation matrix Σ is uniquely defined because the (conditional) rank correlation
coefficients are algebraically independent (i.e. consistent). Finally, analytical updating
given evidence is available because conditional distributions arising from a joint normal
distribution are also normal.

4.2.2

Method for mining an NPBN from a multivariate dataset

Mining an NPBN from a given multivariate dataset that contains k sets of samples of n
random variables involves evaluating the marginal distribution associated with each node
and determining the dependence structure of the NPBN. The method proposed by Hanea
et al. (2010) is employed in the present study. Evaluating empirical marginal distributions
for the random variables is straightforward. The method of developing and validating the
dependence structure of an NPBN involves, firstly validating the assumption that the
multivariate dataset is drawn from a Gaussian copula, and secondly demonstrating that the
developed NPBN has captured the significant dependences implicated in the multivariate
dataset. The validation is carried out based on three correlation matrices: 1) the empirical
rank correlation matrix, ΣE, that is evaluated using the original samples of the variables in
the dataset; 2) the empirical normal rank correlation matrix, ΣN, that is evaluated by
transforming original samples to standard normal variates, then transforming the linear
correlation between the standard normal variates to rank correlations using Eq. (4.3); 3) the
rank correlation matrix associated with the NPBN model, ΣM, that is determined based on
the (conditional) rank correlations attached to the arcs of the NPBN using Eqs. (4.3) and
(4.4).
Let det(ΣE), det(ΣN) and det(ΣM) denote the determinants of ΣE, ΣN and ΣM, respectively.
To validate the assumption that the multivariate dataset is from a Gaussian copula, a
statistical test described as follows is carried out.
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1.1)

Evaluate ΣE and det(ΣE) using the original samples in the dataset.

1.2)

Transform original samples to standard normal variates and evaluate the linear
correlation matrix using the standard normal variates.

1.3)

Generate k sets of samples from the n-variate normal distribution with zero mean
values and the linear correlation matrix evaluated from step 1.2); use these samples
to evaluate the rank correlation matrix and its determinant.

1.4)

Repeat step 1.3) for 1000 times and thus generate 1000 samples of the determinant
of the rank correlation matrix.

1.5)

If det(ΣE) is within the 5-95 percentile range of the samples generated in step 1.4),
it is valid to assume the multivariate dataset being from a Gaussian copula;
otherwise, it is not appropriate to use the Gaussian copula thus NPBN to model the
multivariate dataset.

The rank correlation matrix associated with a saturated NPBN (i.e. an NPBN in which each
node is connected with all the other nodes) coincides with ΣN.

However, the arcs

corresponding to correlations of small magnitudes are considered to reflect the sampling
jitter and should be eliminated from the NPBN. To model the multivariate dataset
parsimoniously, one develops NPBN by adding arcs between random variables such that
the rank correlations between them are the greatest among the elements in ΣN. The rank
correlation matrix associated with the developed NPBN model is denoted by ΣM. To
validate that the developed NPBN has captured the significant dependences implicated in
the multivariate dataset, a statistical test described as follows is carried out.
2.1)

Build a skeletal NPBN, which involves only the arcs representing causal
relationships between nodes; the elements in the linear correlation matrix evaluated
in step 1.2) are used to compute the partial correlations associated with the arcs as
per Eq. (4.4); the evaluated partial correlations are then transformed to conditional
rank correlations attached to the arcs of the NPBN using Eq. (4.3).
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2.2)

The n-variate normal distribution corresponding to the NPBN has zero mean values
and linear correlation matrix that is evaluated from the non-zero partial correlations
associated with the arcs and zero partial correlations implied by the missing arcs
using Eq. (4.4) (see the example in Appendix B).

2.3)

Generate k sets of samples from the n-variate normal distribution described in step
2.2); use these samples to evaluate the rank correlation matrix and its determinant.

2.4)

Repeat step 2.3) 1000 times and thus generate 1000 samples of the determinant of
the rank correlation matrix ΣM.

2.5)

If det(ΣN) is within the 5-95 percentile range of the samples generated in step 2.4),
the current NPBN is accepted; otherwise, go to step 2.6).

2.6)

Find a pair of variables between which there is no arc present in the current NPBN
and the corresponding rank correlation (i.e. the elements in ΣN) is greater than any
other pairs not present in the current NPBN; add the corresponding arc in the
current NPBN, and repeat steps 2.2) through 2.5) until a satisfactory NPBN is
found.

4.3 Formulation of the NPBN model to predict the corrosion depth
Let Xd and 𝐗 = [𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑠 ]T denote the corrosion depth and a vector containing a total
of s predictor variables (i.e. pipeline age and soil parameters), respectively. The NPBN
characterizes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Xd and X using the Gaussian
copula as follows (Sklar, 1959),
𝐶 (𝐹𝑋𝑑 (𝑥𝑑 ), 𝐹𝑋1 (𝑥1 ), … , 𝐹𝑋𝑠 (𝑥𝑠 )) =
ΦΣ (Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋𝑑 (𝑥𝑑 )) , Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋1 (𝑥1 )) , … . , Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋𝑠 (𝑥𝑠 )))

(4.5)

The distribution of Xd conditional on observations of predictor variables Xi (i = 1, 2, …, s)
can be derived by employing the property of the multivariate normal distribution as
follows. The correlation matrix of the (s+1)-variate normal distribution is partitioned as
follows,
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1
Σ=[ T
Σ𝑈𝑑 ,𝐔

Σ𝑈𝑑 ,𝐔
Σ𝐔,𝐔

]

(4.6)

where Ud and U corresponds to Xd and X, respectively, through the inverse normal
transformation; Σ𝑈𝑑 ,𝐔 denotes the correlation between Ud and U, and Σ𝐔,𝐔 denotes the
correlation matrix of U.
T

Let 𝐱 e = [𝑥1,e , … , 𝑥𝑠,e ] denote the evidence for the model updating (i.e. observations of
the predictor variables X). The normal variates transformed from xe are denoted by 𝐮e =
T

[Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋1 (𝑥1,e )) , … , Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋𝑠 (𝑥𝑠,e ))] .

The distribution of Ud conditional on the

observation 𝐮e is a normal distribution with the mean value 𝑚
̅ and standard deviation 𝜎̅,
denoted by (𝑈𝑑 |𝐮e )~𝑁(𝑚
̅ , 𝜎̅), where
−1
𝑚
̅ = Σ𝑈𝑑 ,𝐔 Σ𝐔,𝐔
𝐮e

(4.7)

−1 𝑇
𝜎̅ = 1 − 𝛴𝑈𝑑 ,𝐔 Σ𝐔,𝐔
Σ𝑈𝑑 ,𝐔

(4.8)

Then, the updated CDF of Xd is as follows,

𝐹𝑋𝑑 (𝑥𝑑 |𝐱 𝐞 ) = Φ (

̅
Φ−1 (𝐹𝑋𝑑 (𝑥𝑑 ))−𝑚
̅
𝜎

)

(4.9)

4.4 Overview of Velázquez’s dataset
Velázquez’s dataset consists of 259 samples of the maximum corrosion depth (d) together
with the age of pipeline (t) and local soil parameters collected by excavating buried onshore
pipelines in southern Mexico and carrying out field measurements (Velázquez et al., 2010).
The maximum corrosion depth is the deepest corrosion-caused metal loss on the pipeline
segment exposed in the excavation site (Velázquez et al., 2010), which will be simply
called the corrosion depth hereafter. Detailed information about the data collection process
(e.g. the length of each excavation site and number of measurements of the corrosion depth
at each site) is however unavailable. Each sample consists of values of nine soil parameters
including pH value (pH), pipe-to-soil potential (pp), soil resistivity (re), water content (wc),
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bulk density (bd), dissolved chloride (cc), bicarbonate (bc), sulfate ion concentrations (sc)
and redox potential (rp). Velázquez et al. (2009) indicated that nine samples in the dataset
are outliers with respect to the overall pattern of the data distribution. After the removal
of these outliers, 250 samples are used in the present study, which belong to six soil types:
namely clay (107 samples), sandy clay loam (75 samples), clay loam (59 samples), silty
clay loam (6 samples), silty clay (2 samples) and silt loam (1 sample). Figure 4.2 depicts
the empirical CDFs and CDFs of best-fit parametric distributions for the corrosion depth
and predictor variables (i.e. pipeline age and nine soil parameters).

The CDF and

probability density function (PDF) of the Burr distribution shown in Fig. 4.2(b) is given in
Appendix C. The statistics of d and predictor variables based on samples of the entire
dataset and three soil types with reasonably large sample sizes (i.e. clay, sandy clay loam,
and clay loam) are shown in Table 4.1.
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Figure 4.2 CDFs of the random variables in Velázquez’s dataset
Table 4.1 Statistics of variables involved in Velázquez’s dataset
Entire dataset
Variable
d (mm)
t (years)
pH
pp (mV)
re (Ω·m)
wc (%)
bd
(g/mL)
cc (ppm)
bc (ppm)
sc (ppm)
rp (mV)

Mean

Clay

Sandy Clay
Loam
Mean
COV
(%)
1.25
80
18.91
36
6.24
13
-0.95
24
49.24
99
22.42
26

Mean

1.92
23.01
6.11
-0.87
49.81
23.69

COV
(%)
95
39
15
27
109
26

2.34
24.45
5.93
-0.86
61.10
24.06

COV
(%)
88
35
17
28
107
28

1.30

6.6

1.23

4.2

1.40

41.91
18.25
148.70
168.39

139
115
106
51

53.09
19.26
129.33
177.45

128
130
87
50

21.82
13.77
143.76
169.48

Clay Loam
Mean
2.03
24.63
6.34
-0.82
28.17
24.80

COV
(%)
100
43
14
26
84
21

3.4

1.32

1.7

108
44
69
56

44.61
22.85
205.15
158

121
102
124
44

The empirical rank correlation matrix, ΣE, and empirical normal rank correlation matrix,
ΣN associated with the dataset are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. These tables
indicate that the empirical rank correlations between d and predictor variables range from
0.07 to 0.41, which represents weak to moderate correlations. Among all the predictor
variables, the pH value, dissolved chloride, pipeline age, bulk density, pipe-to-soil potential
and water content have relatively strong correlations with the corrosion depth. While weak
correlations between the corrosion depth and predictors such as the resistivity, sulfate
content and redox potential suggest that direct influences of these predictors on the
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corrosion depth are insignificant, the relatively strong correlations between these predictors
and other predictors (i.e. pp and re, wc and rp) imply their indirect influences on the
corrosion depth.
Table 4.2 Empirical rank correlation matrix (i.e. ΣE) of variables involved in
Velázquez’s dataset
d
t
pH
pp
d 1.00 0.39 -0.41 0.33
1.00 0.15 0.32
t
1.00 0.04
pH
1.00
pp
re
wc
Symmetric
bd
cc
bc
sc
rp

re
wc
-0.15 0.30
-0.20 0.21
-0.29 0.16
-0.36 0.27
1.00 -0.54
1.00

bd
cc
bc
sc
rp
-0.37 0.40 -0.28 -0.14 -0.07
-0.36 0.19 0.03 -0.06 -0.06
0.21 -0.06 0.45 0.15 -0.25
-0.14 0.31 0.04 0.14 -0.25
-0.08 -0.15 -0.19 -0.15 0.35
-0.16 0.21 0.11 0.17 -0.29
1.00 -0.23 0.17 0.17 -0.04
1.00 0.10 0.00 -0.27
1.00 0.27 -0.12
1.00 -0.12
1.00

Table 4.3 Empirical normal rank correlation matrix (i.e. ΣN) of variables involved in
Velázquez’s dataset
d
t
pH
pp
d 1.00 0.37 -0.38 0.33
1.00 0.16 0.29
t
1.00 0.03
pH
1.00
pp
re
wc
Symmetric
bd
cc
bc
sc
rp

re
wc
-0.15 0.31
-0.11 0.22
-0.29 0.16
-0.35 0.24
1.00 -0.54
1.00

bd
cc
bc
sc
rp
-0.37 0.36 -0.26 -0.13 -0.05
-0.36 0.14 0.05 -0.03 -0.05
0.17 -0.01 0.42 0.17 -0.25
-0.13 0.27 0.05 0.15 -0.22
-0.08 -0.13 -0.19 -0.19 0.33
-0.17 0.18 0.11 0.16 -0.25
1.00 -0.23 0.16 0.19 -0.07
1.00 0.18 0.00 -0.23
1.00 0.28 -0.10
1.00 -0.11
1.00
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4.5 NPBN model development and validation using Velázquez’s
dataset
4.5.1

Model development

The model mining method described in Section 4.2.2 is implemented in the software
UNINET® (Hanea, 2008) to develop an NPBN predictive model using Velázquez’s dataset.
First, the empirical marginal distributions for all the variables, empirical rank correlation
matrix (i.e. ΣE) and empirical normal rank correlation matrix (i.e. ΣN) are evaluated. Since
det(ΣE) = 0.069 is within the 5-95 percentile range of the generated samples of the
determinant of the rank correlation matrix (see step 1.5) in Section 4.2.2), i.e. [0.045,
0.096], it is valid to assume that Velázquez’s dataset is from a Gaussian copula and can be
modeled by an NPBN.
The NPBN that models the dependence structure parsimoniously is developed as follows.
Since the arcs representing the correlations between d and predictor variables are essential
for the predictive model, the corresponding arcs are first added to develop the skeletal
NPBN as shown in Fig. 4.3. Note that the correlations present on the arcs of the NPBN
are the (conditional) rank correlations in the normal space. Since det(ΣN) = 0.081 is outside
the 5-95 percentile range of generated samples of the determinant of the rank correlation
matrix associated with the skeletal NPBN (see step 2.4) in Section 4.2.2), i.e. [0.31, 0.44],
the skeletal NPBN shown in Fig. 4.3 is rejected. This suggests that the correlations between
predictor variables should not be completely ignored; in other words, arcs between some
of the predictor variables should be added to the NPBN. By following the procedure
described in step 2.6) of Section 4.2.2, the NPBN shown in Fig. 4.4 is developed through
a few iterations. Since det(ΣN) = 0.081 is within 5-95 percentile range of samples of the
determinant of the rank correlation matrix associated with the NPBN in Fig. 4.4, it is
considered a satisfactory model to represent Velázquez’s dataset.

The histogram

characterizing the empirical marginal distribution, mean value and standard deviation
associated with each node (expressed as mean ± standard deviation) are also shown in Fig.
4.4. In general, there is no best NPBN for modeling a multivariate dataset. The model
developed in Fig. 4.4 only represents one valid NPBN to model Velázquez’s dataset. The
rank correlation matrix, ΣM, associated with the NPBN in Fig. 4.4 is shown in Table 4.4.
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Note that, in comparison to the regression model developed by Velázquez et al. (2009), the
NPBN model takes into account the correlations between soil parameters, which is
meaningful for predicting the corrosion depth under the missing information scenario, i.e.
the values of part of the soil parameters are missing. The missing information scenario is
however not considered in the present study.

Figure 4.3 The skeletal NPBN
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Figure 4.4 Final NPBN developed based on Velázquez’s dataset
Table 4.4 Rank correlation matrix (i.e. ΣM) associated with the NPBN in Fig. 4.4
d
t
pH
pp
d 1.00 0.37 -0.45 0.33
1.00
0
0.29
t
1.00
0
pH
1.00
pp
re
wc
Symmetric
bd
cc
bc
sc
rp

4.5.2

re
wc
-0.15 0.30
-0.10 0.22
-0.27 0.15
-0.35 0.24
1.00 -0.54
1.00

bd
cc
bc
sc
rp
-0.24 0.32 -0.34 -0.09 -0.05
-0.37 0.15
0
0
-0.09
0
0
0.42 0.12 -0.25
-0.11 0.27
0
0
-0.22
0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 0.33
-0.08 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.25
1.00 -0.22
0
0
0.06
1.00
0
0
-0.22
1.00 0.28 -0.11
1.00 -0.03
1.00

Model validation

The exhaustive 5-fold cross-validation (Kuhn and Johnson, 2013) is performed to examine
the predictive capability of the developed NPBN. The entire dataset is divided into five
sub-datasets of equal sample size, i.e. 50. The validation process includes five rounds. In

87

each round, four sub-datasets are assembled to be a training dataset (i.e. 200 samples)
which is used to develop the NPBN. The remaining sub-dataset, referred to as the
validation dataset, is used to examine the predictive capability of the developed NPBN.
This approach ensures that the NPBN is developed and validated by two independent
datasets. Moreover, since every sample in Velázquez’s dataset is used both for training
and validating the model, bias will be avoided in the predictive results. The arcs present
in the NPBN developed in each round are the same as those present in the NPBN in Fig.
4.4, whereas the marginal distributions and correlation matrix vary slightly with different
training datasets. For the developed NPBN, once the nodes denoting soil parameters and
pipeline age are instantiated, the probabilistic distribution, mean value and standard
deviation of the corrosion depth are inferred. Let μd and df denote the predicted mean value
and field-measurement of the corrosion depth, respectively. μd and df associated with the
samples in the five validation datasets are plotted in Figs. 4.5(a) through 4.5(e),
respectively. The linear correlation, ρ, and rank correlation, r, between μd and df are also
included in these figures.
Figures 4.5(a) through 4.5(e) indicate that the results associated with the five validation
sets are similar. Most of the points distribute close to the line representing μd = df, in
particular, for relatively shallow corrosion, say less than 2 mm. As the corrosion depth
increases, the scattering in the points increases. The better predictive accuracy for small
corrosion depths may be explained by the fact that the majority (i.e. more than 80%) of
corrosion depths in the entire Velazquez’s dataset are less than 3 mm. While the prediction
errors for some samples are large, the relatively strong correlation between μd and df
indicates that the predicted mean values of the corrosion depths in general agree well with
the corresponding field-measured values. The scattering in the predictions in Fig. 4.5 may
be attributed to the following reasons. First, Velázquez’s dataset does not capture the
spatial variability associated with soil properties.

Soil properties are in general

heterogeneous over the length of an excavation site (Ricker, 2010). However, the soil
properties of an excavation site are characterized by a single set of parameters in
Velázquez’s dataset.

Therefore, differences may exist between the recorded soil

parameters and those of the soil to which the field-measured corrosion depth is exposed.
Second, the temporal variability of soil parameters is not considered. The soil parameters
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recorded in the dataset only reflect the soil properties at the time of the field survey.
However, some soil parameters could change over time, e.g. the water content and pipeto-soil potential.
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Figure 4.5 Predicted mean values and field-measurements of corrosion depth in
Velázquez’s dataset in the 5-fold cross-validation
The predictive accuracy of the NPBN is compared with the regression model developed by
Velázquez et al. (2009). Figure 4.6 depicts the field-measured depths, mean depths
predicted by the NPBN model (i.e. results in Fig. 4.5), and corrosion depths predicted by
the regression model developed by Velázquez et al. (2009) using the entire Velázquez’s
dataset. The figure indicates that differences in the predictive accuracies of the two models
are slight for corrosion depths less than 6 mm, whereas the regression model outperforms
the NPBN model for extremely deep corrosion defects, say corrosion depths greater than
7 mm. However, the NPBN predictive model is advantageous over the regression models
in that the probabilistic distribution of the corrosion depth can be predicted. The point
estimate (i.e. predicted mean value) together with the 5-95 percentile range can
characterize the uncertainty associated with the prediction. Figures 4.7(a) through 4.7(e)
depict the field-measurements and 5-95 percentile ranges for the samples in the five
validation datasets, respectively. These figures indicate that more than 95% of the fieldmeasured corrosion depths fall in the 5-95 percentile range of the predictions. To be
conservative, appropriate percentile values of the prediction may be used as the point
estimate of the corrosion depth.
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of predictions by the NPBN model and regression model
developed by Velázquez et al. (2009) based on the entire Velázquez’s dataset
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(e) Validation dataset 5
Figure 4.7 5-95 percentile ranges of predicted corrosion depths and field
measurements
The NPBN model can be used to predict the corrosion depth on pipelines buried in different
types of soil, which provides the basis to compare the corrosivity of different soil types.
To create smooth corrosion growth paths, the parametric marginal distributions shown in
Fig. 4.2 are used to replace the empirical marginals in the NPBN, whereas the dependence
structure established in Section 4.5.1 remains. Consider the three representative soil types
with reasonably large sample sizes involved in Velázquez’s dataset (i.e. clay, sandy clay
loam and clay loam), and use the mean values of corresponding soil parameters given by
Table 4.1 to instantiate the NPBN. Figures 4.8(a) through 4.8(c) depict the predicted mean
values and 5-95 percentile ranges of the predicted corrosion depths over a 50-year period.
These figures indicate that the corrosivity of clay is the highest, followed by that of clay
loam and sandy clay loam. This is consistent with the observation in the literature (Jyrkama
et al., 2016; Velázquez et al., 2009).
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Figure 4.8 Predicted corrosion depths for clay, sandy clay loam and clay loam using
NPBN with parametric marginal distributions

4.6 Conclusions
The present study employs the NPBN technique to develop a predictive model for the
corrosion depth on underground pipelines based on Velázquez’s dataset, which consists of
values of the corrosion depth, pipeline age and nine parameters of surrounding soils from
250 excavation sites in southern Mexico. While the empirical rank correlations indicate
that only pH value, dissolved chloride, bulk density, water content and pipe-to-soil
potential have relatively strong correlations with the corrosion depth, the nine soil
parameters are all involved in the NPBN as predictors due to the correlations between the
soil parameters themselves. Taking into account the correlations between predictors
enables the NPBN model to predict the corrosion depth under missing information
scenario, i.e. the values of part of the soil parameters are missing. In comparison with the
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regression models, the NPBN can quantify the probabilistic distribution of the corrosion
depth.
The results of the 5-fold cross-validation indicate that the predicted mean corrosion depths
in general agree well with the field measurements, and more than 95% field measurements
fall in the 5-95 percentile range of the predicted distributions. Moreover, the analysis based
on the NPBN model indicates that, among the three representative soil types in Velázquez’s
dataset, the corrosivity of clay is the highest followed by that of clay loam and sandy clay
loam. The present study demonstrates that the NPBN and associated model mining method
provide an effective means of developing probabilistic predictive models for the corrosion
depth using soil parameters as predictors. This has significant practical implications in
terms of the integrity management of unpiggable pipelines with respect to corrosion.
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5

Optimal sample size determination based on Bayesian
reliability and value of information

5.1 Introduction
The structural reliability analysis of engineering structures generally involves estimating
the failure probability, Pf, as follows,
𝑃𝑓 = ∫Ω 𝑓𝐗 (𝐱)d𝐱
𝑓

(5.1)

where fX(x) denotes the joint probability density function (PDF) of a vector of basic random
variables X such as dimensions of the structural members, material properties and
magnitudes of loads, and Ωf denotes the failure domain that is typically defined through
one or more so-called limit state functions. The integral in Eq. (5.1) can be evaluated using,
for example, the simple Monte Carlo (MC) simulation (Melchers and Beck, 2018),
important sampling-based MC simulation (Melchers and Beck, 2018) and first-order
reliability method (FORM) (Der Kiureghian, 2005; Zhou et al., 2017). Since fX(x) is often
elicited from imperfect information such as expert opinions and databases with limited
sample sizes, there are epistemic uncertainties associated with fX(x). The epistemic
uncertainties can be taken into account in the analysis by considering the distribution
parameters of basic random variables to be uncertain (Der Kiureghian 1989; Der
Kiureghian 2008; Der Kiureghian and Ditlevsen 2009; Hong 1996). This introduces
uncertainty in Pf, which may affect the decision making based on Pf. It is therefore
desirable to gather sufficient samples of X to reduce the uncertainties in fX(x). The
determination of appropriate sample sizes for X is a challenging yet often-encountered task
in the design and assessment of engineering structures; for instance, gathering soil property
data in the design of foundations (Goldswarthy, 2007), proof-load testing quasi-identical
multi-components structural systems (Nishijima and Faber, 2007; Shafieezadeh and
Ellingwood, 2012), collecting corrosion defect data for the integrity management of buried
oil and gas pipelines (Caleyo et al., 2015) and measuring the wall thickness of deteriorating
piping systems in nuclear reactors (Higo and Pandey, 2016). Since the cost of sampling is
in general high, the sample size should be determined by balancing the cost and associated
benefit. This is known as the problem of the sample size determination (SSD).

98

The Bayesian pre-posterior analysis (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961) is a viable approach to
deal with SSD. Pham and Turkkan (1992) employed the pre-posterior analysis to study
SSD for the parameter of the binomial distribution. Assuming the parameter to have a beta
prior distribution and exploiting the conjugacy of the beta-binomial pair, the authors
derived analytical expressions for the expectations of the posterior mean and variance of
the binomial parameter with respect to the outcome of sampling with given sample size.
The appropriate sample size can then be determined by using one of three criteria: limiting
the maximum posterior variance and Bayes risk to pre-determined allowable values,
respectively, and maximizing the expected net gain of sampling (ENGS). Adcock (1992)
extended Pham and Turkkan’s approach to investigating SSD for parameters of the
multinomial distribution by assuming the prior distribution of the parameters to be the
Dirichlet distribution and utilizing the conjugacy of the Dirichlet-multinomial pair. Based
on the pre-posterior analysis and value of information (VoI) concept, Higo and Pandey
(2016) derived an analytical expression for the optimal number of wall thickness
measurements for nuclear piping systems by assuming the wall thickness to follow a
normal distribution. The aforementioned studies address SSD for parameters of specific
distributions; however, there is a lack of a general framework that can deal with SSD for a
wide range of probability distributions by considering the impact of uncertainties in fX(x)
on Pf.
In this study, a novel methodology that is based on the Bayesian pre-posterior analysis of
Pf is developed to deal with SSD. The methodology starts by discretizing the basic
variables for which sample sizes need to be determined. The probability mass functions
(PMFs) of the discretized variables are then assigned Dirichlet prior distributions. The
total probability theorem is employed to express Pf in terms of PMFs of the discretized
variables and conditional failure probabilities corresponding to given values of discretized
variables. This facilitates the pre-posterior analysis of Pf based on those of the discretized
variables. Based on the pre-posterior analysis of Pf and theory of value of information
(VoI) (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961), a criterion for determining the optimal sample sizes to
maximize ENGS is established. Since the Dirichlet distribution can be assigned to the
PMF of the random variable with any distribution type, the methodology is applicable to
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different probability distributions of the basic variables for which sample sizes need to be
determined.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides the formulation
of pre-posterior analysis of the PMF of a random variable and Pf. Section 5.3 establishes
the SSD criterion based on the quadratic loss function. Two examples of SSD concerning
the corrosion assessment of energy pipelines are included in Section 5.4 to demonstrate the
SSD results. Moreover, the sensitivity of the SSD results to the discretization of the
continuous random variables and equivalent sample size of the prior Dirichlet distribution
is also studied in the numerical examples. The chapter is concluded in Section 5.5.

5.2 Pre-posterior analysis
5.2.1

Pre-posterior analysis of PMF

Let Y denote a discrete random variable with m states yj (j = 1, 2, …, m). The PMF of Y is
represented by an m-dimensional vector WY = {WY,1, WY,2, …, WY,m} with ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑊𝑌,𝑗 = 1.
To model the epistemic uncertainty in the distribution of Y, WY is considered uncertain and
hence a random vector. The Dirichlet distribution is often assigned as the prior distribution
of uncertain PMFs in the literature concerning the parameter learning of Bayesian networks
(Spiegelhalter et al., 1993); that is, WY ~ Dir(αY), where “~” denotes the assignment of a
probability distribution, and αY = {αY,1, αY,2, …, αY,m}is the m-dimensional parameter vector
of the Dirichlet distribution. The prior joint PDF of WY, f(wY|αY), is given by (Jonson and
Kotz, 1972),
Γ(𝛼𝑌0 )

𝑓(𝐰𝑌 |𝜶𝑌 ) = ∏𝑚

𝑗=1 Γ(𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 −1
∏𝑚
(0 < wY,j < 1 and αY,j > 0; j = 1, 2, …, m) (5.2)
𝑗=1(𝑤𝑌,𝑗 )

where wY = {wY,1, wY,2, …, wY,m} is the value of WY; Г(•) is the gamma function, and 𝛼𝑌0 =
∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 is commonly known as the equivalent sample size of the Dirichlet distribution.
𝜋
𝜋
The prior mean and variance of WY,j (j = 1, 2, …, m), 𝜇𝑊
and 𝜉𝑊
, respectively, are
𝑌,𝑗
𝑌,𝑗

given by,
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𝜋
𝜇𝑊
=
𝑌,𝑗

𝛼𝑌,𝑗

𝜋
𝜉𝑊
=
𝑌,𝑗

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 (𝛼𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )

(5.3)

𝛼𝑌0

(5.4)

(𝛼𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +1)

Throughout the chapter, the symbols μ• and ξ• are used to denote the mean and variance of
a random variable •, respectively, whereas superscripts π and p are used to denote prior
and posterior statistics, respectively. Note that WY,j and WY,k (j, k = 1, 2, …, m; j ≠ k) are
𝜋
correlated with the corresponding covariance, 𝜔𝑊
, given by,
𝑌,𝑗𝑘
−𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘
2
𝑌0 ) (𝛼𝑌0 +1)

𝜋
𝜔𝑊
= (𝛼
𝑌,𝑗𝑘

(𝑗 ≠ 𝑘)

(5.5)

It follows from Eq. (5.5) that any two components in the Dirichlet distribution are
negatively correlated, which directly results from the fact that ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑊𝑌,𝑗 = 1. This simple
correlation structure is a limitation of the Dirichlet distribution (Caballero el al., 2012).
Now suppose that a set of samples nY = {nY,1, nY,2, …, nY,m} are obtained from the outcome
space of Y, where nY,j (nY,j ≥ 0; j = 1, 2, …, m) represents the number of samples lying in
the j-th state. These samples can be used to update the prior distribution of WY. The
likelihood of nY, L(wY|nY), is of the multinomial form as follows,
𝑛

!

𝐿(𝐰𝒀 |𝐧𝒀 ) = ∏𝑚 𝑌0𝑛

𝑗=1 𝑌,𝑗 !

𝑛𝑌,𝑗
∏𝑚
𝑗=1(𝑤𝑌,𝑗 )

(5.6)

where 𝑛𝑌0 = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑛𝑌,𝑗 , i.e. the total number of samples. Given the conjugacy between the
multinomial and Dirichlet distributions, the posterior distribution of WY is also the
Dirichlet distribution with the corresponding PDF, f(wY|αY, nY), given by (Jonson and Kotz,
1972),
Γ(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )

𝑓(𝐰𝑌 |𝛂𝑌 , 𝐧𝑌 ) = ∏𝑚

𝑗=1 Γ(𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝑛𝑌,𝑗 )

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝑛𝑌,𝑗 −1
∏𝑚
𝑗=1(𝑤𝑌,𝑗 )

(5.7)

It follows that the parameter vector of the posterior Dirichlet distribution of WY is (αY +
nY). The posterior mean, variance and covariance of WY are then given by,
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𝑝
𝜇𝑊
=
𝑌,𝑗

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝑛𝑌,𝑗

𝑝
𝜉𝑊
=
𝑌,𝑗

(𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝑛𝑌,𝑗 )(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 −𝑛𝑌,𝑗 )

(5.8)

𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0

(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)
−(𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝑛𝑌,𝑗 )(𝛼𝑌,𝑘 +𝑛𝑌,𝑘 )

𝑝
𝜔𝑊
= (𝛼
𝑌,𝑗𝑘

𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )

2 (𝛼 +𝑛 +1)
𝑌0
𝑌0

(𝑗 ≠ 𝑘)

(5.9)

(5.10)

A comparison of statistics of the prior Dirichlet distribution (Eqs. (5.3) through (5.5)) and
those of the posterior Dirichlet distribution (Eqs (5.8) through (5.10)) suggests an intuitive
interpretation of parameters of the prior Dirichlet distribution: αY,j is the equivalent (or
pseudo) sample count that lie in the j-th state, and αY0 is the total number of equivalent
sample count. The values of αY,j and αY0 relative to nY,j and nY0 reflect the weight or
importance of the prior belief.

Note that the conjugacy between the Dirichlet and

multinomial distributions has been exploited extensively in the parameter learning
associated with the Bayesian network (Feelders and van der Gaag, 2006; Heckerman et al.,
1998; Masegosa et al., 2016; Spiegelhalter et al., 1993; Zhou et al., 2016).
If a decision is made to draw a total of nY0 samples but the actual sampling process has not
been carried out, the potential sample count in the j-th state (j = 1, 2, …, m) is now a random
variable, denoted by NY,j. The posterior statistics of WY then depend on the realization of
the random vector NY = {NY,1, NY,2, …, NY,m}. This is the pre-posterior analysis (Raiffa and
Schlaifer, 1961). The marginal (or compound) distribution of NY is the so-called Dirichletmultinomial distribution, with the corresponding PDF, f(nY|αY), given by (Johnson and
Kotz, 1972),
𝑓(𝐧𝑌 |𝜶𝑌 ) =

Γ(𝑛𝑌0 +1)Γ(𝛼𝑌0 )

∏𝑚
𝑗=1

Γ(𝑛𝑌0 +𝛼𝑌0 )

Γ(𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝑛𝑌,𝑗 )
Γ(𝑛𝑌,𝑗 +1)Γ(𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )

(5.11)

The mean value and variance of NY,j are,
𝛼

𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑗 = 𝑛𝑌0 𝛼𝑌,𝑗

(5.12)

𝑌0

𝛼

𝛼

𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0

𝜉𝑁𝑌,𝑗 = 𝑛𝑌0 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 (1 − 𝛼𝑌,𝑗) (
𝑌0

𝑌0

1+𝛼𝑌0

)

(5.13)
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Furthermore, the covariance of NY,j and NY,k (j, k = 1, 2, …, m; j ≠ k) is given by,
𝜔𝑁𝑌,𝑗𝑘 = −𝑛𝑌0

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0
(𝛼𝑌0 )2

(

1+𝛼𝑌0

)

(5.14)

Replacing nY,j and nY,k in Eqs. (5.8) - (5.10) with NY,j and NY,k, respectively, one can evaluate
the expectations of the posterior mean, variance and covariance of WY with respect to NY,
respectively, as follows,
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
]=
𝑌,𝑗

𝛼𝑌,𝑗

𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊
]=
𝑌,𝑗

𝛼𝑌0
𝜉𝜋
𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 𝑊𝑌,𝑗

𝑝

E𝑁 [𝜔𝑊𝑌,𝑗𝑘 ] =

(5.15)

𝛼𝑌0

(5.16)

𝑛𝑌0 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )−𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 (𝛼𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +1)−(𝑛𝑌0 )2 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 (𝛼𝑌0 +1)−2𝑛𝑌0 𝛼𝑌,𝑗𝛼𝑌,𝑘 𝛼𝑌0 (𝛼𝑌0 +1)
(𝛼𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +1)(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)

(5.17)

where EN[•] denotes the expectation with respect to NY. Note that the expectation of the
posterior mean (Eq. (5.15)) is the same as the prior mean (Eq. (5.3)). The derivations of
Eqs. (5.15) through (5.17) are shown in Appendix D.

5.2.2

Pre-posterior analysis of Pf

Let Y = {Y1, Y2, …, Yt} (t ≥ 1) denote a subset of random variables of X, for which sampling
is needed and the corresponding sample sizes need to be determined. In this study, Yi (i =
1, 2, …, t) is treated as a discrete random variable with mi states; therefore, continuous
random variables are discretized. Assuming Yi (i = 1, 2, …, t) to be mutually independent,
one can rewrite Eq. (5.1) using the total probability theorem as follows,
𝑃𝑓 = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 Pr(Failure|𝐘 = 𝐲𝑗 )𝑊𝑗

(5.18)

where 𝐲𝒋 = {𝑦1,𝑗1 , 𝑦2,𝑗2 , … , 𝑦𝑡,𝑗𝑡 } denotes the j-th state of Y; ji (i = 1, 2, …, t) varies from 1
to mi; 𝑚 = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑚𝑖 denotes the number of states of Y, and 𝑊𝑗 = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 denotes the
PMF of the j-th state of Y. Given that the PMF of Y, Wj (j = 1, 2, …, m), is considered as
a random vector, Eq. (5.18) implies that Pf is also a random variable, for which the prior
mean value and variance are given by Eqs. (5.19) and (5.20), respectively,
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𝜋
𝜇𝑃𝜋𝑓 = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 𝜇𝑊𝑗

(5.19)

2 π
𝜋
𝜉𝑃𝜋𝑓 = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 𝜉𝑊𝑗 + ∑1≤𝑗≤𝑚 ∑1≤𝑘≤𝑚,𝑘≠𝑗 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 𝑝𝑓,𝑘 𝜔𝑊𝑗𝑘

(5.20)

Once the PMFs of Y are updated by a set of samples, the posterior statistics of 𝑃𝑓𝑝 can be
obtained as follows:
𝑝
𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑓 = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 𝜇𝑊𝑗

(5.21)

𝑝
2 𝑝
𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 𝜉𝑊𝑗 + ∑1≤𝑗≤𝑚 ∑1≤𝑘≤𝑚,𝑘≠𝑗 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 𝑝𝑓,𝑘 𝜔𝑊𝑗𝑘

(5.22)

Equations (5.21) through (5.22) imply that 𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑓 and 𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 are functions of the samples of Y.
Given a prescribed sample size nY0 = {n1,0, n2,0, …, nt,0} for Y, the expectations of the
posterior mean and variance of Pf, E𝑁 [𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑓 ] and E𝑁 [𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 ], with respect to the sampling
outcome in the entire state space of Y, i.e. Y1,1,…, 𝑌1,𝑚1 ,…, Yt,1, …, 𝑌𝑡,𝑚𝑡 , are as follows,
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑓 ] = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊𝑗 ]

(5.23)

𝑝
𝑝
2
E𝑁 [𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 ] = ∑𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊𝑗 ] + ∑1≤𝑗≤𝑚 ∑1≤𝑘≤𝑚,𝑘≠𝑗 𝑝𝑓,𝑗 𝑝𝑓,𝑘 E𝑁 [𝜔𝑊𝑗𝑘 ]

(5.24)

𝑝
𝑝
𝑝
𝑝
𝜋
π
𝜋
The derivations of equations for calculating 𝜇𝑊
, 𝜉𝑊
, 𝜔𝑊
, 𝜇𝑊
, 𝜉𝑊
, 𝜔𝑊
, E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
],
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗𝑘
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗𝑘
𝑗
𝑝

𝑝

E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊𝑗 ] and E𝑁 [𝜔𝑊𝑗𝑘 ] are shown in Appendix E.

5.3 Sample size determination
As presented in Section 5.2.2, the failure probability, Pf, is a random variable due to the
epistemic uncertainties on the distributions of basic random variables. Let 𝑝e denote a
point estimate of Pf. In the Bayesian estimation theory, the quadratic loss function is often
used to reflect the discrepancy between the point estimate of a parameter and the true
parameter (Pham and Turkkan, 1992; Morris, 1968). The quadratic loss function is
advantageous in that the evaluated expected loss is proportional to the variance of Pf.
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Therefore, the quadratic loss function is employed in this study to model the loss caused
by the discrepancy between Pf and 𝑝e as follows,
𝐿(𝑃𝑓 , 𝑝e ) = 𝐶(𝑝e − 𝑃𝑓 )2

(5.25)

where C is the parameter of the quadratic loss function and a positive constant. Since
generally accepted rules to quantify C are scarce in the literature, we determine the
magnitude of C based on the following simple heuristic. Equation (5.25) suggests that the
loss increases as the discrepancy between Pf and 𝑝e increases. The worst loss corresponds
to the upper bound of (𝑝e − 𝑃𝑓 )2, i.e. unity, and equals the cost of failure of the structure.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume C to equal the cost of failure, CF.
The expected loss with respect to the prior distribution of Pf is as follows,
2

E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿] = ∫ 𝐶(𝑝e − 𝑝𝑓 ) 𝑓𝑃𝜋𝑓 (𝑝𝑓 )𝑑𝑝𝑓

(5.26)

It is proved in Appendix F that 𝑝e = 𝜇𝑃𝜋𝑓 is the optimal estimate of Pf in the sense of
minimizing E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿]. It follows that the expected prior loss is,
2

E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿] = ∫ 𝐶 (𝜇𝑃𝜋𝑓 − 𝑝𝑓 ) 𝑓𝑃𝜋𝑓 (𝑝𝑓 )𝑑𝑝𝑓 = 𝐶𝜉𝑃𝜋𝑓

(5.27)

Eq. (5.27) is also known as the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) (Morris, 1968;
Pham and Turkkhan, 1993). Once WY and Pf are updated by a set of samples nY, the
posterior expected loss is evaluated as,
2

E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿|𝐧𝐘 ] = ∫ 𝐶 (𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝𝑓 ) 𝑓𝑃𝑝𝑓 (𝑝𝑓 )𝑑𝑝𝑓 = 𝐶𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓

(5.28)

Equations (5.27) and (5.28) indicate that the expected loss can be expressed as a function
of the variance of Pf regardless of its specific distribution type. Given a prescribed sample
sizes nY0 of Y, the expectation of E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿|𝐧𝐘 ] with respect to the sampling outcome in the
entire space of Y is,
E𝑁 [E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿|𝐧𝐘 ]] = E𝑁 (𝐶𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 )

(5.29)
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It follows that the expected value of sampling information (EVSI) and ENGS are calculated
by Eqs. (5.30) and (5.31), respectively.
EVSI(𝐧𝐘𝟎 ) = 𝐶𝜉𝑃𝜋𝑓 − E𝑁 [𝐶𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 ]

(5.30)

ENGS(𝐧𝐘𝟎 ) = EVSI(𝐧𝐘𝟎 ) − 𝐧𝐘𝟎 𝐂𝑠

(5.31)

T

where 𝐂𝑠 = [𝐶𝑠,1 , 𝐶𝑠,2 , … , 𝐶𝑠,𝑡 ] denotes the unit cost of sampling for Y. The sample size,
𝐧𝐘𝟎−opt , that maximizes the value of ENGS is the optimal sample size.
Note that Eqs. (5.25) through (5.31) formulate EVPI, EVSI and ENGS by considering the
impact of epistemic uncertainty on the failure probability evaluation of a single component.
If the epistemic uncertainty influences the failure probability evaluation of a group of
components, of which the failure probability of each individual component is evaluated,
the total EVPI (EVSI) is equal to the sum of EVPI (EVSI) associated with each individual
components.

5.4 Applications
5.4.1

Example 1: SSD for collecting the samples of model error for the
pipeline burst capacity model

This example considers the reliability evaluation for a group of corrosion defects on a
buried pipeline. The pipeline segment has a nominal outside diameter Dn = 508 mm, a
nominal wall thickness wtn = 5.40 mm and a nominal operating pressure opn = 5.5 MPa.
The pipe is made of API 5L Grade X52 steel with the specified minimum yield strength
(SMYS) of 359 MPa. It is assumed that the pipeline segment contains 100 corrosion
defects that have been detected and sized by a recently conducted inline inspection (ILI).
For simplicity, the ILI-reported sizes of different defects are assumed to be identical. The
probability of burst of the pipeline at each detected defect is calculated. The burst failure
at a given corrosion defect is defined by the following limit state function,
𝑔 = 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑜𝑝

(5.32)
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𝑟𝑏 = 𝜅

2𝑤𝑡 (𝜎𝑦 +68.95)
𝐷

𝑑
𝑤𝑡
𝑑
1−0.85
𝑀𝑤𝑡

[

1−0.85

]

(5.33)

where rb is the burst pressure capacity of the pipe at the defect calculated by the B31G
Modified model (Eq. (5.33)) (Kiefner and Vieth, 1989); op is the (actual as opposed to
nominal) internal pressure of the pipeline; d is the defect depth (i.e. in the through-pipe
wall thickness direction); D is the actual outside diameter; wt is the actual pipe wall
thickness; σy is the actual yield strength; κ denotes the model error associated with the
B31G Modified model, and M is Folias bulging factor which is a function of D, wt and
defect length l (i.e. in the pipe axial direction). The probabilistic properties of the
considered random variables are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Probabilistic characteristics of random variables of the pipeline
Parameter
d
l
D/Dn
wt/wtn
σy/SMYS
op/opn
κ

Distribution

Mean

Normal
0.4wtn
Normal
150 mm
Deterministic
1.0
Normal
1.0
Lognormal
1.1
Gumbel
1.05
Lognormal

1.297

1.5
3.5
3.0

Standard
deviation
0.078wtn
7.8 mm
-

25.8

-

COV (%)

Source
Typical measurement
error of ILI tools
CSA (2015)
Zhou and Huang
(2012)

The distribution of κ given in Table 5.1 is estimated from burst tests of pipe specimens
containing isolated single corrosion defects (Zhou and Huang, 2012). However, suppose
that the majority of the defects considered in this example are clustered corrosion defects;
the probabilistic characterization of κ given in Table 5.1 does not capture entirely the
uncertainty of the burst model for such defects. Given the failure probability is highly
sensitive to the probabilistic property of κ (Zhou and Zhang, 2015), it is desirable to
perform a number of full-scale burst tests on pipe specimens containing clustered corrosion
defects to update the distribution of κ. Since the cost of the burst test is high, the proposed
SSD methodology is applied to determine the optimal number of full-scale burst tests. In
practice, the cost of the full-scale burst test of a corroded pipe specimen, Cκ, is
approximately $100,000. The failure cost, CF, is however difficult to quantify, in particular
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the indirect cost of failure; we assume that CF is 500Cκ. Therefore, the relative magnitudes
of Cκ and CF are 1 and 500, respectively.
The prior distribution of κ, which is the one indicated in Table 5.1, is discretized into 40
states, mκ = 40, and the corresponding PMF is plotted in Fig. 5.1. Wκ is then modeled by
a prior Dirichlet distribution Wκ ~ Dir(ακ), where ακ = {ακ,1, ακ,2, …, ακ,40}. The equivalent
sample size, 𝛼𝜅0 = ∑40
𝑖=1 𝛼𝜅,𝑖 , of the prior Dirichlet distribution is assumed to be unity,
which is commonly assumed in the literature (Zhou et al., 2016). The prior statistics of Pf
associated with a single corrosion defect, 𝜇𝑃𝜋𝑓 and 𝜉𝑃𝜋𝑓 , are calculated to be 0.0068 and
0.0018, respectively. The 𝑝𝑓,𝑖 in Eqs. (5.19) and (5.20) is calculated using the simple MC
simulation with 1,000,000 trials. Note that in the MC simulation to calculate 𝑝𝑓,𝑖 , the
samples of κ is generated from the prior lognormal distribution truncated beyond the
boundaries of the state (κi, κi+1] (Straub, 2009; Zwirglmaier and Straub, 2016).
0.07
0.06

PMF

0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01

(0,0.6]
(0.6,0.65]
(0.65,0.7]
(0.7,0.75]
(0.75,0.8]
(0.8,0.85]
(0.85,0.9]
(0.9,0.95]
(0.95,1.0]
(1.0,1.05]
(1.05,1.1]
(1.1,1.15]
(1.15,1.2]
(1.2,1.25]
(1.25,1.3]
(1.3,1.35]
(1.35,1.4]
(1.4,1.45]
(1.45,1.5]
(1.5,1.55]
(1.55,1.6]
(1.6,1.65]
(1.65,1.7]
(1.7,1.75]
(1.75,1.8]
(1.8,1.85]
(1.85,1.9]
(1.9,1.95]
(1.95,2.0]
(2.0,2.05]
(2.05,2.1]
(2.1,2.15]
(2.15,2.2]
(2.2,2.25]
(2.25,2.3]
(2.3,2.35]
(2.35,2.4]
(2.4,2.45]
(2.45,2.5]
(2.5,∞)

0
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Figure 5.1 Discretization and PMF of κ
To show the impact of the sample size on the uncertainty of failure probability, the variation
of E𝑁 [𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 ] /𝜉𝑃𝜋𝑓 with nκ0 is plotted in Fig. 5.2, which indicates that the epistemic
uncertainty in the failure probability Pf decreases as the sample size increases. The EVPI
is calculated to be 97, which defines the upper bound of EVSI. According to Eq. (5.31),
the upper bound of EVSI equal to 97 suggests that the sampling value associated with any
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sample size large than 97 cannot outweigh the associated sampling cost. The values of
EVSI and ENGS corresponding to nκ0 are then calculated and plotted in Fig. 5.3. This
figure indicates that, as the sample size increases, EVSI increases, whereas the contribution
of a unit sample to EVSI decreases. The peak value on the curve corresponding to ENGS
indicates that the optimal number of burst tests is 9.
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Figure 5.2 Impact of sample size on the uncertainty of failure probability
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Figure 5.3 The results of EVPI and ENGS
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The sensitivity of the SSD results to the number of discretization states of κ is investigated
first. All else being equal, the distribution of κ is discretized into 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50
states, respectively, and the corresponding EVSI and ENGS are plotted in Figs. 5.4 (a) and
5.4(b), respectively. If mκ is equal to or greater than 30, slight changes on EVSI and ENGS
are observed as mκ increases. This suggests that mκ = 40 corresponding to the results shown
in Fig. 5.1 is an adequate discretization strategy for this example. It should be pointed out
that an adequate discretization strategy is problem-specific and generally needs to be
determined through a trial-and-error process.
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Figure 5.4 Sensitivity of SSD results to mκ
The sensitivity of the SSD results to the equivalent sample size ακ0 of the prior Dirichlet
distribution is investigated next. All else being equal, ακ0 is set to 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 and 5,
respectively.

The values of the corresponding EVPI are 154, 129, 97, 65 and 32,

respectively, i.e. EVPI decreases as ακ0 increases. This is due to that a larger ακ0 implies
lower uncertainties in the prior Dirichlet distributions as well as Pf. Figures 5.5(b) and
5.5(c) indicate that for a given sample size nκ0, EVSI and ENGS decrease too as ακ0
increases. However, the same trend does not hold for the optimal sample size: it increases
as ακ0 increases from 0.25 to 2, but decreases as ακ0 increases from 2 to 5. This trend is
explained by the trade-off between two influencing factors, the magnitude of EVSI and
sensitivity of EVSI to the sample size. Figure 5.5(b) indicates that EVSI increases as ακ0
decreases from 5 to 0.25, which tends to lead to a larger optimal sample size according to
Eq. (5.31). On the other hand, Figs. 5.5(a) and 5.5(b) indicate that, as ακ0 decreases, the
sensitivity of E𝑁 [𝜉𝑃𝑝𝑓 ] and EVSI to the sample sizes increases. In the case associated with
small ακ0, EVSI is close to its upper bound even for a relatively small sample size; therefore,
the benefit of more samples may not outweigh the corresponding sampling cost. It follows
that the optimal sample size tends to be smaller as ακ0 decreases.
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Figure 5.5 Sensitivity of SSD results to ακ0

5.4.2

Example 2: SSD for collecting samples of corrosion defect sizes for
unpiggable pipelines

In practice, there are pipelines for which ILI is infeasible or extremely difficult to conduct
due to various reasons such as the tight bends, over- or under-size valves, complicated
connections and a lack of launching and receiving stations for ILI tools (Beauregard et al.,
2018; Rau and Kirkwood, 2016). Such pipelines are commonly known as unpiggable
pipelines. One means to assess the corrosion condition of unpiggable pipelines is to
employ the Bayesian methodology to infer the probabilistic distributions of defect sizes
and density (Caleyo et al., 2015). To carry out this method, the prior distributions of defect
sizes and density can be assumed based on the ILI data of pipelines exposed to similar
corrosive environment as the unpiggable pipeline. Then, a number of pipe joints (a pipe
joint is typically 12 to 20 m long) of the unpiggable pipelines are excavated and inspected
to collect the corrosion data. The collected corrosion data are then used to update the prior
distributions. The resulting posterior distributions can be further used to estimate the
failure probability of the unpiggable pipeline. Since the cost of excavating pipelines is
usually high (Zhang and Zhou, 2014), the developed SSD method is used in the following
example to determine the optimal number of excavations by balancing the sampling cost
and benefit.
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The example considers a 10 km long unpiggable pipeline. The pipeline has Dn = 508 mm,
wtn = 5.4 mm and pn = 5.5 MPa. The pipe steel is API 5L Grade X52 with SMYS = 359
MPa. The pipeline consists of 834 joints, each of which is 12 m long. Usually, one pipeline
joint contains multiple corrosion defects. For simplicity, we assume that the failure
probability of a pipe joint is dominated by the most critical defect on the joint, defined as
the defect at which the pipe joint has the lowest burst pressure capacity. Therefore, only
the most critical defect is considered for each pipe joint. It is further assumed that the
probabilistic distributions of the depths (lengths) of the critical defects on different joints
are identical. A number of pipeline joints will be excavated to collect samples of the defect
depth (d) and length (l) and the optimal number of joints to be excavated is determined by
the proposed methodology. In practice, the cost of excavating a single pipe joint, Cs, is
approximately $200,000. The failure cost, CF, is assumed to be 250Cs. It follows that the
relative magnitudes of Cs and CF are 1 and 250, respectively.

The probabilistic

characteristics of random variables involved in the failure probability evaluation are
summarized in Table 5.2. The limited state function defined by Eq. (5.32) and the B31G
Modified model defined by Eq. (5.33) are employed in this example to evaluate the failure
probability.
Table 5.2 Probabilistic characteristics of random variables
Parameter Distribution Mean COV (%)
Source
d
Weibull
0.3wtn
50
Assumed prior distribution
l
Weibull
75 mm
50
D/Dn
Deterministic
1.0
wt/wtn
Normal
1.0
1.5
CSA (2015)
p/pn
Gumbel
1.0
3
σy/SMYS
Lognormal
1.1
3.5
κ
Lognormal
1.297
25.8
Zhou and Huang (2012)
To apply the proposed methodology to determine the optimal number of joints to excavate,
the prior Weibull distributions of d and l defined in Table 5.2 are first discretized. The
total number of discrete states, md and ml, are both set to be 21. The PMFs of d and l, Wd
and Wl, are plotted in Figs. 5.6(a) and 5.6(b), respectively. Wd and Wl are then modeled
by the Dirichlet distributions with αd0 and αl0 equal to 1. The failure probability of a single
pipe joint is evaluated, and 𝜇𝑃𝜋𝑓 and 𝜉𝑃𝜋𝑓 are equal to 0.0078 and 0.000317, respectively.
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EVPI is calculated to be 66. Let the sample size, n0, vary from 1 through 100, and the
corresponding EVSI and ENGS are calculated and plotted in Fig. 5.7. ENGS reaches its
maximum value at n0 = 8.
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Figure 5.6 Discretization and PMFs of d and l
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Figure 5.7 The results of EVSI and ENGS
To show that md = ml = 21 is adequate for discretization, we consider two more cases of
discretization where md = ml = 41 and md = ml = 81, respectively. The corresponding EVSI
and ENGS are plotted in Figs. 5.8(a) and 5.8(b), respectively, which indicate negligible
differences among the results associated with the three cases of discretization. Therefore,
discretizing the distribution of d and l into 21 states is adequate. This result again
demonstrates that the SSD result is insensitive to the discretization of random variables.
Next, the sensitivity of the SSD results to the equivalent sample sizes αd0 and αl0 of the
prior Dirichlet distributions is demonstrated. All else being equal, αd0 and αl0 are set to
0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 and 5, respectively. The values of corresponding EVPI are 116, 93, 88, 42
and 20, respectively. The corresponding EVSI and ENGS are shown in Figs. 5.9(a) and
5.9(b), respectively, which indicates the same trend as observed in Figs. 5.7(a) and 5.7(b).
The explanations to Figs. 5.7(a) and 5.7(b) are equally applicable to Figs 5.9(a) and 5.9(b).
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Figure 5.9 Sensitivity of SSD results to αd0 and αl0

5.5 Conclusions
This chapter establishes a methodology of SSD for collecting samples to update the
distributions of basic random variables, thus reduce the epistemic uncertainty on the failure
probability evaluation. The basic random variable is discretized and a Dirichlet distribution
is assigned as its prior PMF. The pre-posterior analysis is performed on the PMFs and
failure probability, based on which EVPI, EVSI and ENGS are calculated. The sample
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size that maximizes ENGS is the optimal sample size from an economic standpoint. The
established methodology has the following two merits: First, the discretization of the
continuous random variables and assignment of the Dirichlet distributions to the PMFs
make the methodology applicable to a variety of distribution types as opposed to some
particular conjugate pairs; second, the analytical solutions of EVPI, EVSI and ENGS are
derived, which makes the implementation of the established SSD methodology
computationally efficient.
The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is demonstrated by two numerical
examples in the context of corrosion assessment of buried pipelines: determining the
sample size of the model error of a burst capacity model and determining the number of
pipe joints to excavate for the corrosion assessment of unpiggable pipelines. Parametric
analysis indicates that the SSD result is insensitive to the discretization of the basic random
variables if the random variables are discretized into a fairly large number of states. The
SSD result is highly sensitive to the equivalent sample size of the prior Dirichlet
distribution. EVPI, EVSI and ENGS decrease as the equivalent sample size increases. The
variation of the optimal sample size with the equivalent sample size of the Dirichlet
distributions depends on the trade-off between the influence of the equivalent sample size
on the magnitude of EVSI and sensitivity of EVSI to sample sizes.
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6

Summary, conclusions and recommendations for future study

6.1 General
The work reported in this thesis is focused on employing Bayesian networks and nonparametric Bayesian networks to address four issues in the context of pipeline integrity
management with respect to corrosion and third-party damage. Conclusions drawn from
the four individual studies are summarized as follows.

6.2 Corrosion growth modeling based on dynamic Bayesian
network and parameter learning
Chapter 2 develops a DBN corrosion growth model that incorporates the quantification of
measurement errors in ILI data, characterization of corrosion growth, and evaluation of
failure probability of the pipeline at the corrosion defect.

The model parameters

characterizing the errors in ILI data are learned from a dataset consisting of the matched
ILI and field-measured corrosion depths using the EM algorithm. The EM algorithm is
also employed to learn the model parameters characterizing the annual growth of corrosion
depth from a dataset consisting of corrosion depths reported by multiple ILIs.
The effectiveness of the parameter learning for the DBN model is demonstrated by the
numerical example involving simulated corrosion data. Application of the DBN model on
real corrosion data indicates that the predicted mean corrosion depth in general agree well
with the field-measured depth. In comparison with existing corrosion growth models, the
developed model is advantageous in the following three respects. First, the integrating and
graphical features of the model make the corrosion management more intuitive and
transparent to users. Second, the parameter learning technique provides an automated and
objective way to extract the parameters of the DBN model from ILI data and fieldmeasured data. Third, the efficient inference algorithm of DBN enables the model updating
to be completed highly efficiently.
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6.3 Bayesian network model for predicting the probability of
third-party damage to underground pipelines
Chapter 3 first develops a BN model to evaluate the probability of pipelines being hit by
third-party excavation activities based on a fault tree model widely used in the pipeline
industry, and then employs the EM algorithm in the context of parameter learning to learn
the parameters of the BN model from two incomplete datasets consisting of individual
cases of third-party activities. The TPD datasets simulated by a baseline BN model are
first used to examine the effectiveness of the parameter learning, where the KL-divergence
between the learned CPT and true CPT is adopted as the metric. The BN model and
parameter learning technique are then applied to two real-world TPD datasets collected by
a Canadian pipeline operator between 2010 and 2016. The developed model and parameter
learning are further validated by the comparison between the empirical value and modelpredicted value of two quantities: the probability of a third-party activity being
unauthorized and the probability of hit given an unauthorized activity. The results indicate
that the probabilities predicted by the BN with the parameters obtained from the parameter
learning agree well with the corresponding empirical values.
The developed BN model is advantageous over the existing fault tree model in the
following two aspects. First, the BN model can predict the probability of hit under different
scenarios of available information, i.e. to predict the probability of hit given a third-party
activity with an unknown authorization status, to predict the probability of hit given an
authorized activity or unauthorized activity. Second, the BN modeling together with the
parameter learning technique provide an effective and efficient means to exploit the
historical TPD datasets collected by pipeline operators to learn the failure probabilities of
the preventative and protective measures.

6.4 A non-parametric Bayesian network model for predicting the
corrosion depth on buried pipelines
Chapter 4 develops an NPBN model for predicting the corrosion depth on underground
pipelines.

The dependence structure and model parameters, i.e. (conditional) rank

correlations are extracted from Velázquez’s dataset, which consists of values of the
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corrosion depth, pipeline age and nine parameters of surrounding soils from 250 excavation
sites in southern Mexico. The empirical correlation matrix evaluated using the samples in
Velázquez’s dataset indicates that pH value, dissolved chloride, bulk density, water content
and pipe-to-soil potential are the most influential soil parameters to the corrosion depth.
The 5-fold cross-validation is used to examine the predictive capability of the NPBN
model. In the results, the predicted mean corrosion depths in general agree well with the
field measurements, and more than 95% field measurements fall in the 5-95 percentile
ranges of the predictions. Moreover, the mean value and 5-95 percentile range of corrosion
depth associated with clay, clay loam and sandy clay loam are predicted by the NPBN,
which indicates that the corrosivity of clay is the highest followed by that of clay loam and
sandy clay loam.
In comparison with the regression models, the NPBN can predict the probabilistic
distribution of the corrosion depth, which shows the uncertainty associated with the
prediction. Moreover, since the correlations between predictor variables are taken into
account by the NPBN, the model can handle the prediction of the corrosion depth under
the scenarios of missing information, i.e. the values of part of the soil parameters are
unavailable. The developed NPBN has significant practical implications in terms of the
integrity management of unpiggable pipelines with respect to corrosion.

6.5 Optimal sample size determination based on Bayesian
reliability and value of information
Chapter 5 establishes a methodology to determine the optimal sample size for collecting
samples to update the distributions of basic random variables, thus reduce the epistemic
uncertainty on the failure probability. This methodology first discretizes the basic random
variable and assigns a Dirichlet distribution to the PMFs to characterize the epistemic
uncertainties. The pre-posterior analysis is performed on the PMFs and failure probability,
based on which EVPI, EVSI and ENGS are calculated. The sample size that maximizes
ENGS is the optimal sample size from an economic standpoint. The methodology is
applied to address two SSD problems in the context of corrosion assessment of buried
pipelines: determining the sample size of the model error of a burst capacity model and
determining the number of pipe joints to excavate for the corrosion assessment of
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unpiggable pipelines. Parametric analyses indicate that the SSD results are insensitive to
the discretization of the basic random variables if the random variables are discretized into
a fairly large number of states. Since any continuous random variable can be discretized
and the Dirichlet distribution can be assigned to the PMF, the application of the
methodology is not limited by the original distribution type of the continuous random
variable.

6.6 Main assumptions and limitations
The main assumptions based on which the above studies are carried out are emphasized as
follows. As a result, the limitations in the conclusions should also be noted.
Chapter 2 assumes that the growth path of defect depth follows a linear function of time.
The power-law model is generally considered more appropriate than the linear model to
characterize the corrosion growth. This linear assumption is justified in two aspects. First,
the growth model is updated continuously with the addition of new ILI data. This allows
the predicted growth rate to represent the overall growth path up to the time of the latest
ILI. Second, the fact that the interval between subsequent ILIs is usually relatively short,
i.e. less than 5 years, implies that the forecasting period over which the linear growth path
is extrapolated is relatively short. These two aspects mitigate the error caused by the
deviation of the assumed linear growth path from the actual growth path.
In the TPD analysis tools such as fault trees and BN models, the failure probabilities of
individual preventative and protective measures are assumed to be objective constants.
However, since these measures generally involve human behaviors, the failure
probabilities may vary from regions to regions or companies to companies. As a result,
the BN model and parameters presented in Chapter 3 is more reflective of the TPD
management practice of the company that collects the TPD data. The TPD data from
broader sources are desirable to examine the predictive accuracy of the developed BN or
update the model parameters before the parameter learning results can be generalized.
It is assumed in Chapter 4 that Velázquez’s dataset is drawn from a Gaussian copula, which
is validated by a hypothesis test. The employment of the Gaussian copula is primarily for
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the reason that it allows the analytical inference. In fact, NPBNs can be developed based
on any copula types if only the correlation of zero represents independence between
random variables. Therefore, Velázquez’s dataset may also be modeled by NPBNs based
on other copulas following similar procedures as described in Section 4.2.

6.7

Recommendations for future work

The recommendations for future studies based on the main assumptions, current results and
limitations are described as follows.
First, for simplicity, the DBN corrosion growth model assumes that corrosion depth
follows a linear function of time with an uncertain growth rate. It is a worthy topic to
incorporate more sophisticated models such as the gamma process and power-law function
into the DBN growth models, and compare the predictive accuracy of these DBN growth
models.
Second, the current DBN growth model evaluates the component failure probability, i.e.
the failure probability of the pipeline at a single corrosion defect. Developing a DBN that
can model the correlation between the corrosion growths of adjacent defects, thus evaluate
the system failure probability (i.e. failure probability of a pipeline segment containing
multiple corrosion defects) will benefit the segment-based corrosion management of
pipelines.
Third, TPD data from broader sources are desirable to validate the predictive accuracy of
the developed BN model or be incorporated into the parameter learning to improve the
generality of the learned parameters. Furthermore, the BN model for evaluating the
probability of hit due to third-party excavations can be extended to an influence diagram
by decision and utility nodes, where the utility nodes characterize the cost and benefit of
each individual preventative and protective measures. Such an influence diagram can assist
with the allocation of limited management resources by balancing the cost and benefit of
individual preventative and protective measures.
Lastly, it is worthwhile to employ NPBNs based on other types of copula to model the
Velázquez’s dataset and compare the predictive accuracies of these models. Moreover, the
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NPBN can also be employed to model the dependence of corrosion length and density (i.e.
the number of defects per pipe joints) on the soil parameters if the corresponding datasets
are provided by the pipeline operators. Such models combined with the NPBN developed
in Chapter 4 can be used to predict the failure probability per pipe joint of unpiggable
pipelines using the soil parameters as predictors.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Pipeline attributes for the seven TPD regions in the case study
Pipeline attributes
A1:Dig
notification
requirement

A2: Public
awareness
level of onecall

R-1

Required but
not enforced

Above
average

R-2

Required but
not enforced

Above
average

R-3

Required but
not enforced

Average

R-4

Required and
enforced

Above
average

R-5

Required but
not enforced

Average

R-6

Required and
enforced

Average

R-7

Required but
not enforced

Above
average

TPD
regions

A3: ROW
spacing
Intermittent
and/or very
limited
indication
Continuous but
limited
indication
Continuous but
limited
indication
Continuous but
limited
indication
Continuous but
limited
indication
Continuous but
limited
indication
Continuous but
limited
indication

A4: One-call
type

A5: Response
time to dig
notification

A6: Patrol
frequency

A 7:
Locating
method

A8: Response
method to
notification

A9:
Burial
depth

Unified to
minimum
standard

Three days

Three
times per
year

Magnetic
techniques

Locate/mark/site
supervision

1.2 m

Three days

Semiannually

Magnetic
techniques

Locate/mark/site
supervision

1.2 m

Three days

Three
times per
year

Magnetic
techniques

Locate/mark/site
supervision

1.0 m

Three days

Weekly

Magnetic
techniques

Locate/mark/site
supervision

0.6 m

Magnetic
techniques

Locate/mark/site
supervision

1.5 m

Magnetic
techniques

Locate/mark/site
supervision

1.1 m

Magnetic
techniques

Locate/mark/site
supervision

1.5 m

Unified to
minimum
standard
Unified to
minimum
standard
Unified to
minimum
standard
Unified to
minimum
standard
Unified to
minimum
standard
Unified to
minimum
standard

Three days

Three days

Three days

Three
times per
year
Three
times per
year
Weekly
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Appendix B: Example of evaluating conditional and unconditional rank correlations
using Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4)

1

r13

3
r34;2

r12

2

r24

4

Figure B.1 NPBN with four nodes and four arcs
Consider the NPBN shown in Fig. B.1 and scenario of evaluating the conditional rank
correlations given unconditional rank correlations. Let rij (i, j = 1, 2, …, 4) denote the
unconditional rank correlation (in normal space) between nodes i and j. The conditional
rank correlation r34;2 is determined as follows. According to Eq. (4.4),
𝜌34;2 =

𝜌34 −𝜌23 ∙𝜌24
2 )(1−𝜌2 )
√(1−𝜌23
24

(B.1)

where ρ23, ρ24 and ρ34 are transformed from r23, r24 and r34, respectively, using Eq. (4.3).
Equation (4.3) is then used to evaluate r34;2 from ρ34;2.
Consider now the NPBN in Fig. B.1 and the scenario of evaluating the rank correlation
matrix for the nodes given the conditional rank correlations. Note that r12, r13, r24 are given
by the NPBN. The evaluation of r14, r23, r34 is described as follows. Based on Eq. (4.4),
𝜌23;1 =

𝜌23 −𝜌12 ∙𝜌13
2 )(1−𝜌2 )
√(1−𝜌12
13

(B.2)

where ρ12 and ρ13 are evaluated from r12 and r13 using Eq. (4.3), respectively. Since the
missing arcs imply conditional independence (Hanea et al., 2006), ρ23;1 = 0. Substituting
ρ23;1 = 0 into Eq. (B.2), one can obtain ρ23 = ρ12 ρ13.
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Based on Eq. (4.4),
𝜌34;2 =

𝜌34 −𝜌23 ∙𝜌24
2 )(1−𝜌2 )
√(1−𝜌23
24

(B.3)

where ρ24 and ρ34;2 are evaluated from r24 and r34;2 (r34;2 is given by the NPBN), respectively,
using Eq. (4.3), and ρ23 has been evaluated before. It follows that ρ34 can be obtained from
Eq. (B.3).
Based on Eq. (4.4),
𝜌14;23 =

𝜌14;2 −𝜌13;2 ∙𝜌43;2
2 )(1−𝜌2 )
√(1−𝜌13;2
43;2

(B.4)

where
𝜌13;2 =

𝜌43;2 =

𝜌13 −𝜌12 ∙𝜌23
2 )(1−𝜌2 )
√(1−𝜌12
23

𝜌43 −𝜌42 ∙𝜌23
2 )(1−𝜌2 )
√(1−𝜌42
23

(B.5)

(B.6)

According to the conditional independence implied by the missing arc in the NPBN, ρ14;23
=0. Substituting ρ14;23 = 0, Eqs. (B.5) and (B.6) into Eq. (B.4), one can evaluate ρ14;2.
Again, based on Eq. (B.4),
𝜌14;2 =

𝜌14 −𝜌12 ∙𝜌24
2 )(1−𝜌2 )
√(1−𝜌12
24

(B.7)

ρ14 can then be obtained from Eq. (B.7). It follows that r14, r23 and r24 can be evaluated
from ρ14, ρ23 and ρ24, respectively, using Eq. (4.3).
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Appendix C: The PDF and CDF of Burr distribution
The PDF of Burr distribution is given by,

𝑓(𝑥) =

𝑥 𝛼−1
𝛽
𝑘+1
𝑥 𝛼

𝛼𝑘( )

(𝑥, 𝑘, 𝛼, 𝛽 > 0)

(C.8)

𝛽(1+( ) )
𝛽

where k and α are shape parameters, and β is the scale parameter.
The CDF of Burr distribution is given by,
−𝑘
𝑥 𝛼

𝐹(𝑥) = 1 − (1 + (𝛽) )

(C.9)
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Appendix D: The derivation of the pre-posterior statistics of the basic random
variable Y
For Eq. (5.8), take expectation with respect to NY on both sides,
𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑗 ]

𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
]=
𝑌,𝑗

(D.1)

𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0

Substitute Eq. (5.12) into Eq. (D.1),
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
]
𝑌,𝑗

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑗 ]

=

𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0

=

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑗
𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0

=

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 +𝑛𝑌0

𝛼𝑌,𝑗
𝛼𝑌0

𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0

=

𝛼𝑌,𝑗
𝛼𝑌0

𝜋
= 𝜇𝑊
𝑌,𝑗

(D.2)

which proves Eq. (5.15).
For Eq. (5.9), take expectation with respect to NY on both sides,
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊
]=
𝑌,𝑗

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )−𝛼𝑌,𝑗 E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑗 ]+(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑗 ]−E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑗 2 ]
(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)

(D.3)

Substitute Eqs. (5.12) and (5.13) into Eq. (D.3)

𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊
]
𝑌,𝑗

=

=

=

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )−𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑗 +(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑗 −𝜉𝑁𝑌,𝑗 −(𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑗 )

2

(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )+𝑛𝑌0

𝛼𝑌,𝑗
𝛼𝑌,𝑗
𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼 +𝑛
𝛼𝑌,𝑗 2
(𝛼 +𝑛𝑌0 −2𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )−𝑛𝑌0
(1−
)( 𝑌0 𝑌0 )−(𝑛𝑌0
)
𝛼𝑌0 𝑌0
𝛼𝑌0
𝛼𝑌0
1+𝛼𝑌0
𝛼𝑌0
2
(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 ) (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼Y0 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )(𝛼𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)
(𝛼Y0 )2 (𝛼Y0 +1)(𝛼Y0 +𝑛Y0 )2 (𝛼Y0 +𝑛Y0 +1)

=𝛼

𝛼Y0

𝛼𝑌,𝑗 (𝛼𝑌0 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 )

2
Y0 +𝑛Y0 (𝛼Y0 ) (𝛼Y0 +1)

𝛼Y0

𝜋
𝜉𝑊
𝑌,𝑗
+𝑛
Y0
Y0

=𝛼

which proves Eq. (5.16).
For Eq. (5.10), take expectation with respect to NY on both sides,

(D.4)
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𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜔𝑊
]=
𝑌,𝑗𝑘

−𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑘 ]−𝛼𝑌,𝑘 E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑗 ]−E𝑁 [𝑁𝑌,𝑗 𝑁𝑌,𝑘 ]
(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)

(D.5)

Substitute Eqs. (5.12) through (5.14) into Eq. (D.5),
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜔𝑊
]=
𝑌,𝑗𝑘

=

−𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 −𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑘 −𝛼𝑌,𝑘 𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑗 −𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑗 𝜇𝑁𝑌,𝑘 −𝜔𝑁𝑌,𝑗𝑘
(𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 +𝑛𝑌0 +1)

𝑛𝑌0 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 (𝛼𝑌0 + 𝑛𝑌0 ) − 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 (𝛼𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 + 1) − (𝑛𝑌0 )2 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 (𝛼𝑌0 + 1) − 2𝑛𝑌0 𝛼𝑌,𝑗 𝛼𝑌,𝑘 𝛼𝑌0 (𝛼𝑌0 + 1)
(𝛼𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 + 𝑛𝑌0 )2 (𝛼𝑌0 + 1)(𝛼𝑌0 + 𝑛𝑌0 + 1)

(D.6)
which proves Eq. (5.17).
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Appendix E: The derivation of the prior, posterior and pre-posterior statistics of Wj
The probability of the j-th state of the vector Y representing the basic random variables is
denoted as,
𝑊𝑗 = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖

(E.1)

where 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 denotes the ji-th PMF of the i-th basic random variable.
The prior statistics of Wj are calculated by Eqs. (E.2) through (E.4) as follows,
𝜋
𝜋
𝜇𝑊
= E𝑌𝜋 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝜇𝑊
𝑗
𝑖,𝑗

(E.2)

𝑖

π
𝜉𝑊
= V𝑌𝜋 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 2 ] − ∏𝑡𝑖=1(E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ])
𝑗
2

= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 (V𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] + (E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]) ) − ∏𝑡𝑖=1(E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ])
2

π
𝜋
𝜋
= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 (𝜉𝑊
+ (𝜇𝑊
) ) − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 (𝜇𝑊
)
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖

𝑖

2

2

2

(E.3)

𝑖

𝜋
𝜔𝑊
= Cov𝑌𝜋 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 , ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]
𝑗𝑘

= E𝑌𝜋 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] − E𝑌𝜋 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝜋 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]
= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]
𝜋
= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝜇𝑊
𝜇𝜋
𝑖,𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑘
𝑖

(E.4)

𝑖

where,
𝜋
𝜋
E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = Cov𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 , 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] + E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = 𝜔𝑊
+ 𝜇𝑊
𝜇 𝜋 if ji ≠ ki
𝑖,𝑗𝑘
𝑖,𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑘
𝑖

2

𝑖

𝜋
𝜋
E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = V𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 , 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] + E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝜋 [𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = 𝜉𝑊
+ (𝜇𝑊
) if ji = ki
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖

𝑖

The posterior statistics Wj are calculated by Eq. (E.5) through (E.7) as follows,
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𝑝
𝑝
𝜇𝑊
= E𝑌𝑝 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝜇𝑊
𝑗
𝑖,𝑗

(E.5)

𝑖

p

𝜉𝑊𝑗 = V𝑌𝑝 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 2 ] − ∏𝑡𝑖=1(E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ])
2

= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 (V𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ] + (E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]) ) − ∏𝑡𝑖=1(E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ])
2

2

2

2

𝑝
𝑝
𝑝
= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 (𝜉𝑊
+ (𝜇𝑊
) ) − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 (𝜇𝑊
)
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖

𝑝

𝑖

(E.6)

𝑖

𝑝

𝜔𝑊𝑗𝑘 = Cov𝑌 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 , ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]
= E𝑌𝑝 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] − E𝑌𝑝 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝑝 [∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]
= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]
𝑝
= ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 𝜇𝑊
𝜇𝑝
𝑖,𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑘
𝑖

(E.7)

𝑖

where,
𝑝
𝑝
E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = Cov𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 , 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] + E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = 𝜔𝑊
+ 𝜇𝑊
𝜇 𝑝 if ji ≠ ki
𝑖,𝑗 𝑘
𝑖,𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑘
𝑖 𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

2

𝑝
𝑝
E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = V𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 , 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] + E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 ]E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ] = 𝜉𝑊
+ (𝜇𝑊
) if ji = ki
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖

𝑖

The pre-posterior statistics Wj are calculated by Eq. (E.8) through (E.10) as follows,
𝑝
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
]
𝑗
𝑖,𝑗

(E.8)

𝑖

2

2

𝑝
𝑝
𝑝
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊
] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 (E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊
] + E𝑁 [(𝜇𝑊
) ]) − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑁 [(𝜇𝑊
) ]
𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖

𝑖

where
2

𝑝
E𝑁 [(𝜇𝑊
𝑖,𝑗

𝑖

2

) ]=

𝛼𝑖,𝑗 𝛼𝑖,𝑘 +2𝛼𝑖,𝑗 𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑗 +(𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑗 ) +𝜉𝑁𝑖,𝑗
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
(𝛼𝑖0 +𝑛𝑖0 )2

𝑖

(E.9)
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𝑝
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜔𝑊
] = ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑁 [𝐸𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]] − ∏𝑡𝑖=1 E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
𝜇𝑝 ]
𝑗𝑘
𝑖,𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑘
𝑖

(E.10)

𝑖

where,

E𝑁 [E𝑌𝑝 [𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ]] = {

𝑝
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜉𝑊
] + E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
𝜇𝑝 ]
𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑘
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑝
𝑝
E𝑁 [𝜔𝑊
] + E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊
𝜇𝑝 ]
𝑖,𝑗 𝑘
𝑖,𝑗 𝑊𝑖,𝑘
𝑖 𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑗𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖
𝑗𝑖 ≠ 𝑘𝑖

where
2

𝑝

𝑝

E𝑁 [𝜇𝑊𝑖,𝑗 𝜇𝑊𝑖,𝑘 ] =
𝑖

𝑖

𝛼𝑖,𝑗 𝛼𝑖,𝑘 +2𝛼𝑖,𝑗 𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑗 +(𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑗 ) +𝜉𝑁𝑖,𝑗
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑗𝑖 =
(𝛼𝑖0 +𝑛𝑖0 )2
𝛼𝑖,𝑗 𝛼𝑖,𝑘 +𝛼𝑖,𝑘 𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑗 +𝛼𝑖,𝑗 𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑘 +𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑗 𝜇𝑁𝑖,𝑘 +𝜔𝑁𝑖,𝑗 𝑘
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖 𝑖
2
(𝛼
𝑖0 +𝑛𝑖0 )
{

𝑘𝑖
𝑗𝑖 ≠ 𝑘𝑖

The prior, posterior and pre-posterior statistics of the PMFs of individual basic random
variables, 𝑊𝑖,𝑗𝑖 and 𝑊𝑖,𝑘𝑖 , and the statistics of the counts of samples, 𝑁𝑖,𝑗𝑖 and 𝑁𝑖,𝑘𝑖 ,
involved in Eqs. (E.2) through (E.10) can be calculated by Eqs. (5.3) through (5.5), Eqs.
(5.8) through (5.10) and Eqs. (5.12) through (5.17).
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Appendix F: Optimal point estimate of failure probability
The expected loss is evaluated as follows,
2

E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿] = ∫ 𝐶(𝑝e − 𝑝𝑓 ) 𝑓𝑃𝑓 (𝑝𝑓 )𝑑𝑝𝑓

(F.1)

The derivative of Eq. (F.1) with respect to 𝑝e is,
dE𝑃𝑓 [𝐿]
d𝑝e

= 2𝐶 ∫(𝑝e − 𝑝𝑓 )𝑓𝑃𝑓 (𝑝𝑓 )𝑑𝑝𝑓 = 2𝐶 (𝑝e − 𝜇𝑃𝑓 )

(F.2)

Let Eq. (F.2) equal to zero. It follows that the minimum value of E𝑃𝑓 [𝐿] occurs at 𝑝e =
𝜇 𝑃𝑓 .
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